The legal effect of a coup d'etat on traditional constitutional concepts by Mkwentla, Nelson Koala
 
THE LEGAL EFFECT OF A COUP D’ ETAT 
ON TRADITIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCEPTS 
 
 
 
THESIS 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED IN FULFILMENT OF THE 
REQUIREMENT FOR THE DEGREE OF 
 
 
MASTER OF LAWS OF RHODES 
UNIVERSITY 
 
 
BY 
 
 
NELSON KOALA MKWENTLA 
 
 
DECEMBER 2001 
SUPERVISOR:  PROFESSOR PLASKET 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
DECLARATION 
 
 
 
I declare that The Legal Effect of a Coup d’ etat on Traditional 
Constitutional Concepts is my own work in design and execution, 
and that all the sources that have been used or cited have been 
acknowledged accordingly, and duly reflected in the bibliography. 
 
I certify that this thesis has not been submitted at any other 
university.  
 
 
 
 
(i) 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
           PAGE 
 
a) DECLARATION        (i) 
 
b) PREFACE         (ii) 
 
c) TABLE OF CASES        (iii) & (iv) 
 
d) ABSTRACT         (v) – (vii) 
 
e) INTRODUCTION        (viii) 
 
1. Theoretical Background       1 
 
 1.1 Hans Kelsen       1 
 1.2 Revolution:  Definition      2 
 1.3 Kelsen’s pure theory of law     3 
 1.4 Norms        3 
 1.5 Validity        4 
 1.6 The function of the Grundnorm    5 
 
2. Kelsen applied        7 
 
 2.1 Pakistan        7 
 2.2 Seychelles        10 
 2.3 Uganda        11 
 2.4 Zimbabwe        12 
 2.5 Ghana        15 
 2.6 Grenada        17 
 2.7 Lesotho        18 
 2.8 South Africa       19 
 2.9 Conclusion        19 
 
3. The necessity principle in constitutional law   21 
 
 3.1 Introduction       21 
 3.2 Constitutional law position     22 
 3.3 The Pakistan cases      24 
 3.4 The position in Cyprus      27 
 3.5 The Rhodesian crisis      29 
 3.6 The Madras crisis       31 
 3.7 The Nigerian crisis      32 
 3.8 The Grenada revolution      35 
 3.9 Conclusion        36 
 
4. The role of the Judiciary      39 
 
 4.1 Pakistan        40 
 4.2 Uganda        40 
 4.3 Lesotho        41 
 4.4 Rhodesia        43 
 
5. The impact of revolution on some constitutional concepts 49 
 
 5.1 The legislature       50 
 5.2 A rigid constitution      51 
 5.3 Supremacy of the constitution     53 
 5.4 Separation of powers      54 
 5.5 The Rule of law       57 
 5.6 On fundamental rights      61 
 5.7 The right to life       62 
 5.8 Inhuman treatment      65 
 5.9 Rights of refugees       66 
 5.10 Freedom of Association      67 
 5.11 What is left of judicial review in the military regime 68 
 5.12 The independence of the judiciary    70 
 5.13 Democracy        71 
 
6. The African experience       73 
 
 6.1 Uganda        73 
 6.2 Lesotho        75 
  
 Bibliography        78 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE 
 
I would like to thank Mrs. Shirley Maclennan who is now a retired Rhodes University 
staff member, for her unfailing help and enthusiam. 
 
My heart-felt gratitude is also extended to the centre for Science Development for 
its financial assistance during the first year of this research, expenses involved in 
the research were met with their financial assistance during that year. 
 
I would also like to thank Mr. Sidzamba of Lesotho High School, the present 
Lesotho Deputy Prime Minister and Dr.Yvonne, King of Nnamdi Azikiwe University 
of Nigeria for sacrificing part of their very tight schedule for my interviews. 
 
A word of gratitude goes to Professor John Grogan for his guidance and 
encouragement.  My greatest indebtedness goes to my Supervisor Professor Plasket 
for marking and re-marking this work that shall not fall into the dust roads of 
history and be forgotten. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(ii) 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This thesis deals with constitutional law and other legal subjects such as 
Jurisprudence and Judicial Review. 
 
One constitution is distinguishable from another by its own provisions.  These 
provisions are usually referred to as either the basic characteristics or features of 
the particular constitution and these are invariably derived from the basic political 
philosophy and constitutional arrangements of the particular country.  A coup 
affects these characteristics in different ways.  Some automatically disappear as 
being incompatible with the revolution; some are modified, others are 
strengthened.  The usurpers may choose to set aside the constitution completely 
and replace it with another, or amend it to suit the new situation, or rule without 
any constitution. 
 
This often happens amidst the rattle of weapons and the whirr of military engines 
in and around the capital of a given country on that awesome occasion.  This thesis 
sets out to examine the legal aspects of a coup d’ etat.  The thesis is divided into 
six broad sections.  Part one will deal with the theoretical background.  I shall 
discuss an overview of Kelsen’s pure theory of law.  The second part deals with the 
scope of its application in revolutionary situations and will also touch upon the 
reason behind the Kelsen’s theory as shown by decided cases from country to 
country. 
 
The third part deals with the essence as well as the significance of the doctrine of 
necessity to validate unconstitutional acts in the case of a coup d’ etat.  This 
discussion is to pave the way for the fourth part which is to explore the position of 
judges who took oath of office under the old constitution.  I am to explain their 
position after a coup d’ etat.  The fifth part forms the gist of my research.  I shall 
examine the effect of a coup d’ etat on traditional constitutional concepts such as 
fundamental rights, separation of powers, rule of law and judicial review in the 
military regime.  The sixth part will deal with African experience.  I shall include 
recommendations and conclusions drawn from the Lesotho and Uganda 
experiences.  
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 ABSTRACT 
 
 
This thesis commences with a short biography of Professor Hans Kelsen 
who was born in Prague in 1881 and died in 1973.  Kelsen’s Pure Theory 
of Law is central to this thesis.  He has provided a base, that is the 
theoretical background to this thesis.  He has given a broad definition of a 
revolution that includes a coup d’ etat.  Kelsen’s pure theory of law is a 
theory of the positive law.  Kelsen’s basic norm becomes important in the 
event of a revolution. 
 
I shall consider the application of Kelsen’s pure theory of law, that is the 
scope of its application in revolutionary situations and the reason behind 
the Kelsenian theory as shown by decided cases from country to country.  
In Pakistan, Kelsen’s theory was accepted and applied in the case of the 
State v Dosso 1958 PLD 533 SC.  The court decided that the revolution 
had been successful as it satisfied the test of efficacy and thus became a 
basic law creating fact.  In articulating this conclusion, the court relied 
explicitly on Kelsen’s work.  In Pakistan, Kelsen’s pure theory of law has 
not been universally accepted.  In the case of Asthma Jilani v The 
Government of the Punjab PLD 1972 SC 139 it was held that the theory  
(v) 
 had no application on the facts.  In the case of Bhutto v Chief of Staff, 
Pakistan Army and Federation of Pakistan PLD 1977 SC 670 the court went 
further.  It held that the theory was at odds with the foundations of the 
Pakistani state.  Anwarul Haq CJ stated that the birth of Pakistan is 
grounded both in ideology and legality and that as a result a theory of law 
which seeks to exclude these considerations, cannot be made the binding 
rule of decision in the courts of this country.  In Seychelles, Uganda and 
Grenada Kelsen has been accepted as a basis for legitimacy but in these 
countries it was clear that the new regime had effective control.  In 
Rhodesia one has a gradual shift from necessity to successful revolution 
with the passage of time and in Lesotho and South Africa Kelsen seems to 
have been applied without much question. 
 
Other than the application of Kelsen’s theory in the event of a revolution 
the courts have a second choice when they are called upon to decide on 
the validity of post revolution law namely the doctrine of necessity.  Where 
this doctrine has been applied, partial recognition occurs where only the 
act of the revolutionary government are recognised but not the 
revolutionary government per se because it is necessary to do so in order 
to maintain or ensure civil order. 
(vi) 
 The role of the Judiciary in the event of a revolution is very important.  
The Judges are in a dilemma, whether to resign, whether to remain in 
office. 
 
A coup d’ etat affects the basic characteristics of the particular 
constitution.  These are affected in different ways.  Some automatically 
disappear as being incompatible with the revolution, some are modified 
while others are strengthened.  Among these is constitutionalism which is 
examined to measure the performance of the rulers after a successful 
revolution. 
 
The African experience shows the unconstitutional experience of Uganda 
and the undemocratic experience of Lesotho. 
 
It is recommended that Africa should take unified stand to curb coups.  
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
1.1 HANS KELSEN  
 
At the heart of any discussion on the legal effect of a coup d’ etat on traditional 
constitutional concepts one will find the Kelsenian theory of successful revolution.  
For this reason, this chapter will commence with a short biography of Professor 
Hans Kelsen whose pure theory of law is so central to this topic. 
 
The following autobiography is derived from a book written by Derek van der 
Merwe. 
 
Hans Kelsen was born in Prague in 1881.  He died in 1973.  In 1906, Kelsen 
completed a Doctor Juris from the University of Vienna.  In 1911 he completed his 
Habilitationsschrift which gained him admission to the teaching staff of the 
University of Vienna Law Faculty.  In June 1914 he was appointed to a teaching 
post at the Exportakademie, a University institution in Vienna specialising in 
international commerce but was called up for military service soon thereafter.  At 
the end of the First World War in 1918, Kelsen was appointed full Professor at the 
University of Vienna.  He consolidated his reputation as an internationally acclaimed 
Jurist while holding this position. 
 
Kelsen was asked to participate in the drafting of a new Constitution for Austria.  
The section creating a Constitutional Court was his brain child.  The new 
Constitution became law in 1920. 
 
Kelsen was appointed a Judge of the Constitutional Court in 1921.1  In a reform of 
the court in 1930, however, his judicial appointment was terminated.  The court 
reform was the result of politically unpopular decision of the Court, given on 
Kelsen’s advice.  Kelsen left Vienna after his dismissal as a Judge in 1930 and 
accepted a teaching post at the University of Cologne.  In 1933 Kelsen became a 
victim of the persecution of the Jews at the hands of the Nazis, when his services 
at the university were terminated.  He then accepted an invitation to teach at the 
Institute for International Affairs in Geneva.  In 1936 he accepted a chair in 
international law at the German University of Prague but he left Prague in 1938, 
returning to Geneva.2 
 
 
1. Derek van der Merwe, Hans Kelsen – Legal Positivism’s Supreme Champion, in Essays on Law and Social 
Practice in South Africa, Hugh Corder, Cape Town, Juta and Co. 1988 93,95 
2. Derek van der Merwe at 96 
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Kelsen left for the United States in 1940 where he taught at Harvard Law School 
(on the invitation of Roscoe Pound) on part time basis for two years.  He then 
taught at the University of California in Berkeley in the Department of Political 
Science.  In 1946 his General Theory of Law and State was published there.  He 
received a full professorship in 1945 and remained at the University until his 
retirement in 1952.  He died in California in 1973 at the age of ninety one.3 
 
1.2 REVOLUTION:  Definition 
 
Kelsen, for purpose of his pure theory of law, says that a revolution occurs 
whenever the legal order is replaced in an illegitimate way, in a way not prescribed 
by the former order.  It is, in this context, irrelevant whether or not replacement is 
effected through a violent uprising against the legitimate organs empowered to 
create and amend the legal oder.4  It is also irrelevant whether the replacement is 
effected through a movement emanating from the mass of the people, or through 
the actions of those in government positions or otherwise.  From a juristic point of 
view, the decisive criterion of a revolution is that the order in force is overthrown 
and replaced by a new order in a way in which the former did not itself anticipate.  
In other words then, every illegal change in the constitution of a State is a 
revolution.5  At its most basic, therefore, a revolution entails an effective seizure of 
state power.  J.M. Finnis says that a change in the identity of a legal system occurs, 
 
‘Whether by division of one system into two or by absorption of several into 
one.’6 
 
Kelsen goes on to say that: 
 
‘A revolution in the broader sense of the word (that includes a coup d’ etat) is every 
not legitimate change of the constitution or its replacement by another constitution.  
It is irrelevant whether this change of the legal situation has been brought about by 
the application of force against the legitimate government or by the members of 
that government themselves, whether by a mass movement of the population or by 
small group of individuals.  What is important is that the valid Constitution has been 
changed or replaced in a manner not prescribed by the Constitution valid until 
then.’7 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Derek van der Merwe at 96 
4. Hans Kelsen, General theory of law and State, Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 1946 (translated by 
Anders Wedberg) at 115 
5. J.M. Finnis, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford, Claredon Press, 1973, (edited by AWB Simpson) at 44 
6. J.J. Finnis, at 50-51 
7. Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law”, London, University of California Press Berkeley 1970 at 209 
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Muhammad Munir, C.J. gives a relevant definition: 
  
 ‘A revolution is generally associated with public tumult, mutiny, violence and  
bloodshed but from a juristic point of view the method by which and the persons by 
whom a revolution is brought about is wholly immaterial.  The change may be 
attended by violence or it may be perfectly peaceful.  It may take the form of a 
coup d’ etat by a political adventurer or it may be effected by persons already in 
public positions.’8 
 
1.3 KELSEN’S PURE THEORY OF LAW  
 
Kelsen considered himself a positivist and his pure theory of law is a theory of the 
positive law.  It gives an answer to the question, what is law?  It is concerned 
solely with that part of knowledge which deals with law, excluding from such 
knowledge everything which does not strictly belong to the subject-matter law.9  
This theory is concerned to show the law as it is, without legitimising it as just, or 
disqualifying it as unjust; it seeks the real, the positive law, not the right law.  In 
this sense it is a radically realistic theory of law.  The pure theory of law separates 
the concept of the legal completely from that of the moral norm and establishes the 
law as a specific system independent even of the moral law.10 
 
1.4 NORMS  
 
Kelsen says that those norms which have the character of legal norms and which 
make certain acts legal or illegal are the objects of the science of law.  The 
meaning of norm is that something ought to be or ought to happen, especially that 
a human being ought to behave in a specific way.  Norm is the meaning of an act 
by which a certain behaviour is commanded, permitted, or authorized.11 
 
Riddal says that  
 
‘A norm is thus something to be conformed to.’12 
 
It is the existence of the legal norm that distinguishes the order of the official from 
that of the gangster.  A norm can thus be seen as an expression of intention, one 
individual wills that in specified circumstances another should act in a certain 
way.13 
 
 
 
8. The State v. Dosso 1958 PLD at 538 
9. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law’, 1934 (vol 50), Law Quarterly Review at 477  
10. (1934) 50 LQR at 482 - 485 
11. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of law, Berkeley, Los Angeles London:  University of California Press 1970 at 4-5 
12. J.G. Riddall, Jurisprudence, Wellington, Butterworths 1991 at 106 – 107  
13. J.G. Riddall, at 106 – 107  
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1.5 VALIDITY  
 
Kelsen says that a norm is valid because it ought to be obeyed and applied.  A 
general legal norm is regarded as valid only if the human behaviour that is 
regulated by it actually conforms with it, at least to some degree.14 
 
According to Kelsen, 
 
‘A legal order or system consists of a hierarchy of norms, each deriving its validity as a rule of law 
from some superior norm.  If we ask why a constitution is valid, we usually will come upon an older 
constitution from which its pedigree is drawn.  Ultimately, we reach a constitution that is the first 
historically.  The validity of this first constitution is the final postulate upon which the validity of all 
the norms of a legal order depends.’15  
 
A legal system is thus like a collapsible pyramid with the Grundnorm as the 
foundation rock.  The Grundnorm is the ultimate norm from which all subordinate 
norms in the legal system derive their validity.16  Thus in any legal system it is only 
by presuming the validity of the orginal, basic norm (which Kelsen calls the 
Grundnorm), that the norms that descend from it can be counted as valid.  
Hilaire McCoubrey says that  
 
‘The Grundnorm is the starting-point of any chain of legal norms, the apex of a normative pyramid 
which, through a long line of connections, authorises that decisions and actions taken in the system 
at ground level.’17 
 
Kelsen says that the Grundnorm must be formulated as follows: 
 
‘Coercive acts sought to be performed under the conditions and in the manner which the historically 
first constitution, and the norms created according to it prescribe.’18 
 
This foundation on which other norms are based is referred to by Kelsen as the 
‘basic norm’ (ursprungnorm) or the ‘Constitution in the legal – logical sense’ 
(Verpassung in rechtslogischen sinne).19  Kelsen says that the basic norm ‘brings 
about the unity of the system’ and founds the system of the legal order.20 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:  University of California Press 1970 at 11  
15. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge:  Massachusetts, Harvard University Press 1946 at 
115 
16. Mitchell v DPP 1986 LRC (Const.) at 53 
17. Hilaire McCoubrey and Nigel D. White, Text Book on Jurisprudence, Great Britain, Blackstone Press Limited 
1993 at 133  
18. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London:  University of California 1970 at 200-1 
19. Julius Stone, Modern Law Review, (vol.26) 1963 at 35  
20. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge:  Massachusetts, Harvard University Press 1946 at 
124 
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Derek van der Merwe says that it should be noted that the Grundnorm is not 
identical to the constitution, as some commentators would seem to think.21  Kelsen 
goes on to say that the higher norm legitimises the lower norm.  This higher norm, 
again, is valid because it was created by an act of will authorised by a still higher 
norm. 
 
So might one trace the validity of each and every norm of a legal order to higher 
more general norms.  A legal order therefore consists of a hierarchical structure of 
lower norms and increasingly generalised higher norms.  In every instance, the 
inquirer will eventually arrive at the constitution, whether written or unwritten, of 
the legal order.  This constitution, in the final analysis, contains all the norms in 
terms of which the creation of all the other norms of the legal order are 
commended, authorised and permitted.22  Kelsen deals with the hierarchic 
structure of legal norms, that is a norm of superior degree determines the act by 
which the inferior norm is to be made.23  I can say that the Grundnorm must be all 
important.  The highest factor in a hierarchy of norms, the mathematician’s highest 
common factor is the Grundnorm.  The Grundnorm therefore must have no rule 
behind it.  It is the fons et origo, the final norm. 
 
1.6 The function of the Grundnorm: 
 
The function of the basic norm becomes particularly apparent if the Constitution is 
not changed by Constitutional means, but by revolution. 
 
Hans Kelsen says that it is irrelevant whether this change of the legal situation has 
been brought about by the application of force against the legitimate government 
or by the members of that government themselves, or by a small group of 
individuals.  The requirement is that the existing Constitution must be changed or 
replaced in a manner not prescribed by the constitution valid until then.  Usually a 
revolution abolishes only the old constitution and certain politically important 
statutes.  A large part of the statutes created under the old constitution remains 
valid.24  The basic norm is a useful guide in countries where a revolution has 
occurred.  In the aftermath of such unconstitutional change, lawyers have believed 
that Kelsen’s theory of the change of the basic norm was the key to unlock the 
mystery of the validity of pre and post revolutionary laws. 
 
 
 
 
21. Van der Merwe, at 108 
22. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press 1970 at 
221  
23. Hans Kelsen, ‘The Pure Theory of Law’, Part II, 1935 (vol.51) at 523 
24. Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of Law, Berkeley Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1970 at 
209 
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Hans Kelsen says that every Jurist will presume that the old order to which no 
political reality any longer corresponds, has ceased to be valid and that all norms, 
which are valid within the new order, receive their validity exclusively from the new 
Constitution.  Therefore the norms of the old order can no longer be recognised as 
valid norms.  He goes on to say that a new basic norm is pre-supposed.  A new 
norm endowing the revolutionary government with legal authority.  If the 
revolutionaries fail, their undertaking is an illegal act, they can be charged with 
treason according to the old constitution and its specific basic norm.25  
 
Whenever a Coup d’ etat is staged it is not in accordance with the principle of 
legitimacy.  It is deliberately contrary to it.  In all Coup d’ etat situations, there are 
no pretensions on the part of the plotters to follow the procedure described by the 
Constitution of a given country. Constitutions provide neither for a transfer of 
power in a Coup d’ etat manner nor for a military government.  Perhaps, in an 
apparent bid to preclude a forcible take over of government, the 1979 Nigerian 
Constitution provided that: 
 
‘The Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any person or group of persons 
take control of the government of Nigeria or any part thereof except in accordance with the 
provisions of this Constitution.’26 
 
Implied in the above provision is first, that government must be run in accordance 
with the provisions of the Constitution.  Second is the attempt to bar forcible take 
over of government, as it is expressly provided in the Constitution that the electoral 
process shall be the only recognised manner of changing government.  The makers 
of the constitution perhaps forgot that in a revolutionary situation the law is not to 
be sought for in the books but in the events that surround us. 
 
To prove that the above Constitutional provision was not an effective remedy to 
prevent a revolution in the circumstances of Nigeria, in 1983 the army staged a 
Coup d’ etat and gave legal effect to their authority by substituting the old legal 
order for a new one.27  Indeed one of the first and obvious casualties in the 
process of suspending and modifying the older Constitution was the above quoted 
section which seeks to preclude forcible take over.  
 
If a revolution does not fail, all laws emanating from the new government would 
not be subject to review because the old order under the pre-revolution 
Constitution would have yielded to the new legal order.  If a revolution fails 
however, the provisions of the old Constitution will apply and the supreme court 
would be able to consider the Constitutionality of any law made by the organ that 
has usurped the power, for example the military government. 
 
25. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge: Massachusetts, Harvard University Press 1946 at 
118. 
26. Section 1 (2) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria of 1979. 
27. Suspension and Modification Constitution which was a product of the December 31, 1983 Coup d’ etat. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
KELSEN APPLIED 
 
Revolutions, in the Kelsenian sense, are unfortunately by no means rare occurrences.  
Not surprisingly, therefore, the law reports of a number of countries provide a range of 
examples of courts grappling with the problem of when and in what circumstances 
revolutionary governments should be recognised as lawful.  This part of this chapter 
contains a survey of some of these cases.  They illustrate how courts have applied 
Kelsen’s theory in deciding on the status of a revolutionary regime. 
 
2.1 Pakistan .1 Pakistan  
 
The application of Kelsen’s pure theory of law was first applied in Pakistan in the case 
of the S .v. Dosso.1  On 07 October 1958, the President annulled the Constitution of 02 
March 1965 by issuing a proclamation dismissing the central cabinet and the provincial 
cabinets and dissolving the National Assembly and both the Provincial Assemblies.  
Martial Law was declared to be in force and General Muhammad Ayub Khan was 
appointed as the Chief Martial Law Administrator.  Three days later the President 
promulgated the Laws Continuance in Force Order, the effect of which was to validate 
the laws in force prior to the revolution, other than the Constitution, and confirm the 
jurisdiction of the Courts. 
 
Dosso and a number of other appellants had been convicted under the Frontier Crimes 
Regulation 1901.  They argued that the sections of the Regulations which provided for 
referrals of cases to Councils of Elders and which authorised their conviction were void 
because they conflicted with the Constitution of 1956.  The central issue in this case 
therefore was whether the Constitution of 1956 was still in force. 
 
Muhammad Munir C.J. for the majority defined the issue in Kelsenian terms as 
follows,2 
 
‘But if the revolution is victorious in the sense that the persons assuming power under the change can 
successfully require the inhabitants of the country to conform to the new regime, then the revolution 
itself becomes a law creating fact because thereafter its own legality is judged not by reference to its 
own success.  On the same principle the validity of the laws to be made thereafter is judged by 
reference to the new and not the annulled Constitution. ’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. 1958 PLD 533 SC  
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2. The State v Dosso at 539 
 
The court decided that the revolution had been successful as it satisfied the test of 
efficacy and thus became a basic law-creating fact.  On that basis the Laws 
Continuance in Force Order, however transitory or imperfect it may be, was held to 
create a new legal order.  It was in accordance with this order that the validity of the 
laws and the correctness of judicial decisions was to be determined.3  In articulating 
this conclusion, the court relied explicitly on Kelsen’s work, describing him as a 
renowned modern jurist4. 
 
Doubts had been raised in Pakistan itself concerning the correctness of the decision in 
S.v. Dosso.  It was overruled thirteen years later by the Supreme Court itself in Jilani 
v. Government of the Punjab5.  This appeal arose out of a judgement of the Lahore 
High Court, dismissing a petition under Article 98(2)(b)(i) of the Constitution of 1962 
challenging the validity of the detention of the father of the petitioner, a Mr Malik 
Ghulam Jilani.  The detainee in this case, was arrested under an order, purportedly 
made in terms of Martial Law Regulation no. 78 of 1971.  The Government raised a 
preliminary objection that the High Court could not assume jurisdiction in the matter, 
because of the bar contained in the Jurisdiction of Courts (Removal of Doubts) Order, 
1969, promulgated by the Martial Law regime. 
 
The High Court, relying on S.v. Dosso held that the order of 1969 was a valid and 
binding law and that jurisdiction had been ousted by clause 2 of the order.  The Court 
of Appeal was required to consider whether  the doctrine enunciated in S.v. Dosso was 
correct and even if correct, whether it applied to the facts and circumstances in which 
Field Marshall Ayub Khan had transferred power to General Agha Muhammad Yahya 
Khan and whether all legislative and executive acts performed by Khan, including the 
imposition of Martial Law and the promulgation of Martial Law Regulation and Orders, 
were illegal.  
 
Harmoodur Rahman C.J. overruled the S.v. Dosso case.  It had been argued that 
Muhammad Munir C.J. in the S.v. Dosso case had not waited to see whether the 
efficacy element required by Kelsenian theory had, in fact, been attained by the 
change to which he gave legal recognition.  The case was decided within six days of 
the promulgation of Martial Law and within three days of the promulgation of the Laws 
Continuance in Force Order.  It was therefore premature to decide on efficacy.  This 
was borne out by the fact that the usurper was removed from power the day after 
judgement was given, placed under house arrest and expelled from the country.6  He 
said, for instance:7 
 
 
3. Dosso at 540 
4. Dosso at 539 
5. PLD 1972 SC 139 
6. Jilani at 163 and at 177 
7. Jilani at 179  
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‘Kelsen . Continues to be grievously misunderstood.  He was only trying to lay down a pure theory  
of law as a rule of normative science consisting  of an aggregate or system of norms.  He was       
propounding a theory of law as a mere jurist’s proposition about law.  He was not attempting to lay 
down any legal norm or legal norms which are the daily concern of Judges, legal practitioners or 
administrators.’ 
 
He went on to say that;8 
 
‘His purpose was to recognize that such things as revolutions do also happen but even when they are 
successful they do not acquire any valid authority to rule or annul the previous grundnorm until they 
have themselves become a legal order by habitual obedience by the citizens of the country.  It is not the 
success of the revolution, therefore, that gives it legal validity but the effectiveness it acquires by 
habitual submission to it from the citizen.’ 
 
In rejecting the approach adopted in Dosso, he said that Muhammad Munir C.J. erred 
in interpreting Kelsen’s theory and in applying it to the facts.  The principle enunciated 
in Dosso, could not be treated as good law.9 
 
The court decided the orders before it were not only illegitimate but were also 
incapable of being maintained on the ground of necessity.  The detention was illegal 
and the High Court should have declared the impugned orders of detention to be void 
and of no legal effect.10 
 
Dosso’s case was also discussed in the case of Bhutto v Chief of Army Staff.11  On 17 
March 1977, general elections were held in Pakistan.  The Pakistan People’s Party, led 
by Prime Minister Zulfika Ali Bhutto, was credited with 155 to 200 elected seats in the 
National Assembly.  The extent of the victory was greater than had been expected.  
The opposition immediately denounced the elections as rigged.  There was widespread 
rioting in which the deaths of over three hundred people were reported.  The Prime 
Minister held talks with the opposition in an effort to resolve the crisis but to no avail.  
The armed forces stepped in on 05 July 1977.  Proclamations issued by General 
Muhammad Ziaul Haq, the Chief of the Army Staff, removed the Prime Minister from 
office, dismissed the Provincial Governors and Ministers, and dissolved the National 
and Provincial Assemblies but provided for the continued operation of existing laws.  
Martial Law was imposed throughout the country.  The Prime Minister and other 
leaders of his party were detained under Martial Law Order no. 12 of 1977.  Bhutto’s 
wife sought his release on the ground that both the imposition of Martial Law and 
Martial Law Order no. 12 were unconstitutional, being in breach of the Constitution of 
1973. 
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8. Jilani at 183 
9. Jilani at 183 
10. Jilani at 208 
11. PLD 1977 SC 670 
 
Anwarul Haq C.J. indicated that Kelsen’s theory is open to criticism by making the 
effectiveness of the political change the sole test of its legality.  He said that Kelsen’s 
theory does not accommodate sociological factors of morality and justice which 
contribute to the acceptance or effectiveness of the new legal order.  He concluded 
that the legal consequences of such a change must be determined by a consideration 
of the total milieu in which the change is brought about, including the motivation of 
those responsible for the change, and the extent to which the old legal order is sought 
to be preserved or suppressed12.  He also held that the theory of revolutionary legality 
had no application where the breach of legal continuity was of a temporary nature or 
for a specified limited purpose.  That could be better described as constitutional 
deviation rather than a revolution.  It was, he held, improper to apply Kelsen’s theory 
to such a transient and limited change.13 
 
He held in dismissing the petition that the court had found that it was possible  to 
validate extra Constitutional action of the Chief Martial Law Administrator not only for 
the reason that he stepped in to save the country at  a time  of grave national crisis 
and constitutional break - down, but also because of the solemn pledge given by him 
that the period of consultation deviation would be of as short a duration as possible, 
and that during this period all his energies would be directed towards creating 
conditions conducive to the holding of free and fair elections, leading to the restoration 
of democratic rule in accordance with the dictates of the Constitution.14 
 
Anwarul Haq C.J. stated that the court expected the Chief Martial Law Administrator to 
redeem this pledge, which he described as being in the nature of a mandate from the 
people of Pakistan, who had, by and large, willingly accepted his administration.  In 
similar vein, Muhammad Akram, J. said that,  
 
‘ours is an ideological state of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan.  Its ideology is firmly rooted in the 
objectives Resolution with emphasis on Islamic laws and concept of morality.  In our way of life we do 
not and cannot divorce morality state.  It had no place in our body politics and is unacceptable to the 
judges charged with the administration of justice in this country.’15 
 
2.2 Seychelles  
 
The application of Kelsen’s pure theory of law was considered in the case of Controller 
of Taxes v Ramniklal Valabhaji.16  This was an appeal against the dismissal of an 
application to set aside a judgement for the payment of income tax arrears.  The 
validity of the Income Tax Decree of 1978 was challenged.  It was argued that the 
Decree was unconstitutional and invalid because it was inconsistent with the 
Independence Republican Constitution 1976.  A coup d’ etat had occurred on 05 June 
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1977 which had deposed the constitutional government and placed in power Frans 
Albert Rene to make laws by decree having the same effect as an Act of Parliament.   
12. Bhutto at 692 – 693  
13. Bhutto at 693  
14. Bhutto at 723 
15. Bhutto at 733 
16. Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1981.  The Judgement in this case is not available to me.  I have relied on the discussion of the 
case in Mitchell V. Director of Public Prosecutions 1986 LRC (Const.), 67 - 71  
 
 
 
 
Rene’s regime drafted a Constitution in 1979 which was endorsed by elections. 
Therefore his government had become the constitutional government of the 
Seychelles. Rene had promulgated the Income Tax Decree. 
 
The court had the advantage of deciding the issue some four years after the coup.  
During that period the revolutionary regime was not challenged and there had been 
stable and effective government in the Seychelles, with no interruption in the ordinary 
life of its citizens.  Hogan P. held that the Income Tax Decree of 1978 was valid.  He 
concluded17 
 
‘I see no reason to differ from the view expressed by Garner that when a regime is firmly established 
and accepted as legitimate this legitimation is extended back to cover legislation enacted by the regime 
from the inception of its control.  For these reasons, I think the Income Tax Assessment Decree (1978) 
was a valid enactment.’ 
 
The Kelsenian theory was thus applied in the Seychelles, in the Valabhaji case. 
 
2.3 Uganda: 
 
On 22 February 1966 the then Prime Minister of Uganda, Dr Milton Obote, issued a 
statement declaring that in the interests of national stability and public security and 
tranquility he had taken over all powers of the Government of Uganda.  On 24 
February 1966 he suspended the Constitution of 1962.  On 2 March 1966, he declared 
that, acting with the advise and consent of the cabinet, the executive authority of 
government vested in the Prime Minister would henceforth be exercised by the Prime 
Minister acting in accordance with the advice and consent of the cabinet and that the 
duties, powers and other functions that were performed or were exercisable by the 
President or Vice-President immediately before 22 February 1966 would be vested in 
the Prime Minister and be exercisable by him with the advice and consent of the 
cabinet.18  What the Prime Minister had done was unconstitutional.  The President and 
Vice-President could not be removed from their office except by a resolution passed by 
the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of the National Assembly and 
his usurpation of their powers and functions was not contemplated by the 1962 
Constitution.  
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A state of emergency was declared and the Emergency Powers (Detention) 
Regulations 1966 were made.  On 11 August 1966, the applicant in Uganda v 
Commissioner of Prisons, ex parte Matovu19 was served with a detention order and 
detained.  After being detained Matovu, a Buganda Country Chief filed a habeas 
corpus application based on the ground that the detention order was invalid, as it was 
contrary to the fundamental rights provisions in section 28 of the 1962 Constitution.   
 
17. Quoted in Mitchell at 70 – 71  
18. 1966 EA 514  
19. Matovu at 535   
 
The Attorney-General, for the state, relied heavily on Kelsen in his argument.  He 
submitted that a revolution had occurred in law, that consequently the 1962 
Constitution was of no force or effect and that the 1966 Constitution was valid in law.  
Sir Udo-Udoma C.J. reading the judgement of the court said,  
 
‘These submissions were doubtless unresistable and unassailable.  On the theory of law and state 
propounded by the positivist school of jurisprudence represented by the famous Professor Kelsen, it is 
beyond question, and we hold, that the series of events, which took place in Uganda from February 22 to 
April 1966  Could only appropriately be described in law as a revolution.’20 
 
Concluding on the point, the Chief Justice said,’21 
 
‘Applying the Kelsenian principle, which incidentally forms the basis of the judgement of the Supreme 
Court of Pakistan in the above case, our deliberate and considered view is that the 1966 Constitution is a 
legally valid constitution and the supreme law of Uganda, and that the 1962 Constitution having been 
abolished as a result of a victorious revolution in law does no longer exist nor does it now form part of 
the Laws of Uganda, it having been deprived of its de facto and de jure validity.  The 1966 Constitution, 
we hold, is a new legal order and has been effective since 14 April 1966 when it came into force.’ 
 
In Matovu’s case affidavits were submitted by a large number of officials, the purpose 
of which was to prove that the new Constitution was efficacious and that it had been 
accepted by the people since it came into force in April 1966.  The contents of these 
affidavits were not challenged or contradicted.  On the strength of this evidence the 
court found that the new Constitution had been accepted by the people of Uganda. 
The Chief Justice went on to say,  
 
‘The 1966 Constitution we hold, is a new legal order and has been effective since April 14, 1966, when it 
first came into force.’22 
 
There was evidence therefore that the people had approved and accepted both the 
revolution and the 1966 Constitution.  On this basis the court introduced the political 
doctrine of the sovereignty of the people as a factor to be taken into account in 
applying the doctrine of successful revolution.  The application of Kelsen’s theory 
consequently defeated the applicant’s case that his detention was unlawful. 
 
2.4 Zimbabwe:  
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This country was known as Rhodesia until 1980 when it attained independence and 
was renamed Zimbabwe.  The name Rhodesia shall be used in that context.  Prior to 
the Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in November 1965, Rhodesia was a 
British colony, enjoying dominion status and its government functioned according to 
the Constitution of 1961.  In terms of this Constitution the achievement of 
independence required the assent of the British Parliament.   
 
20. Matovu at 535  
21. Matovu at 539  
22. Matovu at 539  
 
The Constitution envisaged a gradual advance of the African majority then denied 
significant political rights towards full political power.  Britain instituted an unimpeded 
progress towards majority rule, but the Rhodesian Front Party, headed by the Prime 
Minister, Mr Ian Smith, resisted it.  This issue was the raison d’ etre of UDI.23 
 
A cluster of cases collected around the issue of the legality of the Smith regime in the 
years after UDI.  Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke, 24 was the first and the most 
important of these cases.  It was a challenge to the legality of UDI rule and the validity 
of the 1965 Constitution passed simultaneously with the declaration.  Smith and his 
cabinet had remained in office despite the fact that the Governor of the Colony 
dismissed them and the British Parliament had on 16 November 1965, passed the 
Southern Rhodesia Act 1965 declaring Britain’s continued responsibility for the 
territory, and the Southern Rhodesia Constitution Order in Council 1965 which declared 
all legislative and administrative actions of the rebellious colony null and void.  Smith 
acted on the basis that the 1965 Constitution had superceded the 1961 one.  There 
was no disturbance.  The country was run as smoothly and as effectively as before. 
 
In Madzimbamuto the applicant’s husband had been detained under emergency 
regulations made under the 1965 Constitution.  The applicant’s case, in essence, was 
that the detention was illegal and unconstitutional under the 1961 Constitution.  The 
case thus raised the question directly, of the legality of the post UDI government.  The 
respondent’s main contention was that the Smith government was the only effective 
one in Rhodesia.  The court dismissed the application on the basis of necessity.  It 
held that the Smith government was the only effective government of the country and 
that in order to avoid chaos and a vacuum in the law effect had to be given to such 
measures, both legislative and administrative, as could lawfully have been taken by a 
lawful government under the 1961 Constitution for the preservation of peace and good 
government and the maintenance of law and order.25  The court rejected the 
respondent’s Kelsenian argument that, although the means by which independence 
had been declared and the 1965 Constitution had been introduced were illegal, the 
government since 11 November 1965 had become the de jure government through its 
effective control of the country and the complete overthrow of the old order and that, 
accordingly, the de jure status of the government had to date back retrospectively to 
11 November 1965. 
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Lewis J. stated that he had no difficulty in accepting the Kelsen doctrine in the normal 
situation where one had a state which is already a sovereign independent state 
changing its form of government or its constitution by a successful internal revolution. 
 He referred to events in Zanzibar, Ghana and Nigeria as instances where change of 
Constitution through a successful overthrow of the old order brought with it a lawful 
status to the new regime.   
 
23. AJG. Lang, ‘Madzimbamuto  and Baron’s case at First Instance’, 1964, Rhodesia Law Journal at 68; D.B. Molteno, 
The Rhodesian crises and the Courts’, 1969, C.I.L. S.A. at 254. 
24. 1966 R.L.R. at 756  
25. Madzimbamuto  at 756  
 
He found that the doctrine would only apply in such a case where the revolution had 
not only succeeded internally but against all efforts of whatsoever nature of the 
mother country to suppress it.26  On appeal, in Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke,27 
Beadle C.J. held that the Smith government was in complete administrative and 
legislative control of the country and was continuing to maintain the existing courts of 
law, whose orders it was enforcing.  None of the legislative acts of the United Kingdom 
had been recognized or enforced in the territory since UDI.  There was no other 
government within the territory competing with it in the exercise of its legislative and 
administrative powers.28  He held further, the status of the Smith government was 
that of a de facto government, in the sense that it was in fact in effective control over 
the state’s territory and that this control seemed likely to continue.  But the 
government was not so firmly established as to justify a finding that it was a de jure 
government.29  He also held that the government could lawfully do anything which its 
predecessor could lawfully have done, but until the 1965 Constitution was firmly 
established, and it had thus became the de jure Constitution of the territory, its 
administrative and legislative acts had to conform to the 1961 Constitution.  The 
continued detention of Daniel Madzimbamuto under regulation 47(3) of Various 
Emergency Powers (Maintenance of Law and Order) Regulations was declared by 
Beadle C.J. to be unlawful on this basis. 
 
Quenet J.P. held that, in the two years following UDI, the Smith’s government had 
established itself as the country’s paramount authority.  It was the sole law maker.  It 
maintained the courts and was in exclusive control of the country’s administration and 
of its national forces.  There was no doubt that since 11 November 1965 it had been 
the country’s effective de facto government.30  He held further that during the 
previous two years the country’s internal stability had not been shaken and that, 
having weathered the initial storm the government had achieved internal de jure 
status.  His decision was that the Smith government was the country’s de facto 
government and that it had also acquired internal de jure status.  The continued 
detention of the first appellant’s husband was declared to be unlawful because 
regulation 47(3) was ultra vires the enabling Act.31 
 
MacDonald J.A. held that the government was a de facto government, but that as far 
as a municipal court was concerned it was also a de jure government, as it was the 
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only law making and law enforcing government functioning for the time being in the 
territory.32  Jarvis A.J.A. held that the government had effective control of the territory 
which seemed likely to continue, and that legal effect could be given to its legislative 
measures and administrative acts which were not inconsistent with the 1961 
Constitution.33 
26. 1968 (2) S.A. 284 (A) 
27. Madzimbamuto  306  
28. Madzimbamuto  326  
29. Madzimbamuto   368 
30. Madzimbamuto  at 332 
31. Madzimbamuto  376 
32. Madzimbamuto  at 416  
33. Madzimbamuto  at 422  
Fieldsend A.J.A who subsequently became the Chief Justice of zimbabwe held that the 
Smith regime was neither a de facto government nor a de jure government, but the 
doctrine of necessity provided a basis for the acceptance as valid of certain of their 
acts.34 Mrs Madzimbamuto was granted special leave to appeal to the Privy Council.35 
 
Her appeal was allowed by a majority.  The Privy Council held that however successful 
the revolution might appear to have been internally, or however effective it appeared 
to be at the time, the sovereign power was striving to crush the rebellion, albeit 
without the use of force.  As a result, the rebellious regime could not attain de jure 
status internally, otherwise, there would be two lawful governments co-existing. 
 
In R.v. Ndhlovu36 the accused were charged with contravening section 48A of the Law 
and Order (Maintenance) Act.  This was an Act passed by the UDI government.  The 
accused objected to the indictment on the basis that the legislature of Southern 
Rhodesia was not legally empowered to make any laws.  They contended that the 
provisions of section 48A were therefore null and void and the indictment therefore 
disclosed no offence.  Davies J. held that the court did not sit under the 1961 
Constitution, that the court was not therefore in the same hierarchy of courts as the 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Judicial Committee’s judgement in 
Madzimbamuto  was not therefore binding on it.37  On appeal,38 Beadle C.J. held that 
the 1961 Constitution had been annulled by the efficacy of the change.  The Appellate 
Division upheld the findings of Davies J.  The Court found further that the 1965 
Constitution was the only valid Constitution and that, on the basis of fresh 
circumstances, the existing government had achieved internal de jure status. 
 
2.5. Ghana  
 
The position in Ghana is illustrated by the case of Sallah v Attorney General.39  The 
case arose out of a military coup which had toppled President Nkrumah’s government 
on 24 February 1966.  The Coup leaders formed a National Liberation Council to 
govern Ghana, suspended the 1960 Republican Constitution, and promulgated a 
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proclamation on 28 February 1966 providing that persons in public or government 
office on the eve of the coup would continue in office, subject to enactments brought 
into force after that date by virtue of that proclamation.  The plaintiff had been 
appointed a manager in the Ghana National Trading Corporation (GNTC) in October 
1967.   
 
34. Madzimbamuto  422  
35. (1968) 3 All E.R. 561  
36. 1968 (4) S.A. 207  
37. R.V. Ndhlovu and Others 1968(4) S.A. 515 at 532  
38. 1968(2) S.A. at 352  
39. Constitutional Supreme Court case no. 8 of 1970.  The judgement in this case was not available to me.  I have relied 
on the discussion of the case in Mitchell V. Director of Public Prosecutions (1986)  (LRC) Const. 64 
 
 
 
The GNTC was a state owned trading corporation established under the statutory 
Corporations Act 1964. 
 
A new Constitution was enacted in 1969.  Section 9(1) provided for the termination of 
appointments of officers appointed by the National Liberation Council in 1966.  The 
appellant, who had been appointed in 1967 to a public office in a corporation 
established under a statute, had his appointment terminated in February 1970 by 
virtue of section 9(1).   
 
He challenged the validity of the termination, contending that his office had not been 
established by the National Liberation Council but by the statute.  The Attorney 
General argued that the coup d’etat of 1966 had destroyed the old legal order, 
including not only the 1960 Constitution but existing laws, such laws having been re-
validated under the Proclamation of 26 February 1966.  Therefore the appellant’s 
appointment came under the transitional provision of 1969.  The majority of the Court 
of Appeal rejected the Attorney General’s submissions. 
 
Apaloo J.’s basic attitude was that Kelsen’s analysis was irrelevant.  He expressed 
scant respect for jurisprudence and legal philosophy as useful in the judicial task of 
statutory interpretation.  He said that the literature of jurisprudence was remote from 
the immediate practical problems that confronted judges called upon to interpret 
legislation or to administer any law.40  In response to the Attorney General’s Kelsenite 
argument, he had this to say:41 
 
‘This contention seems to me highly artificial and I cannot believe that, with the known pragmatism that 
informs judicial attitudes towards questions of legislative interpretation, the Attorney General can have 
thought an argument such as this was likely to carry seasoned judicial minds.  We should fail in our duty 
to effectuate the will of the Constituent Assembly if we interpreted the Constitution not in accordance 
with its letter and spirit, but in accordance with some doctrinaire juristic theory.’ 
 
Sowah J. held  that he was not going to derive much assistance from foreign theories. 
 He went on to impugn the validity of Kelsen’s analysis.  He said:42 
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‘One is entitled to ask whether theories propounded by the great jurists ranging from the time of Plato, 
Marx on to Hans Kelsen are immutable and of general application and whether those theories must 
necessarily fit into legal scheme of every country and every age?  I do not think so.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
40. Referred to in Mitchell at 64 
41. Quoted in Mitchell at 64 – 65  
42. Quoted in Mitchell at 65  
 
 
It was a far-fetched interpretation to say that the National Liberation Council was re-
establishing or creating anew all the laws of Ghana including the common law and 
customary law.  The true interpretation was that those laws in existence should 
continue subject of course, to subsequent decrees that might be promulgated.  Archer 
J. also rejected the Kelsenian approach.  He had difficulty in locating any new 
grundnorm after the coup. 
 
Amin J. thought differently.  In a judgement based on Kelsen he held that, after the 
coup in February 1966, the old legal order founded on the 1960 Constitution yielded to 
a new legal order under an omnipotent, eight member, military cum police sovereign.  
Consequently, all public offices founded on this old legal order were automatically 
abolished.  He said that notwithstanding the fact that public offices which were in 
existence prior to the coup bore practically the same names as after the coup, the true 
legal position was that these public offices and services were the creation of the 
National Liberation Council and they existed by virtue of, and in pursuance of the 
proclamation promulgated on 28 February 1966 and in certain specific case in 
pursuance of subsequent National Liberation Council decrees. 
 
S.K. Date-Bah suggests that the Court of Appeal should not have dismissed Kelsen so 
casually without a more serious and analytical consideration of his work.43 
 
Professor Ben Nwabueze,44 is of the opinion that the events of 24 February 1966 
destroyed the authority of the 1960 Constitution and with it all the laws and offices 
made or established under it. It is interesting that, while repudiating Kelsen, some of 
the judges, perhaps unwittingly, still talked of the fall of the first Republic.  Does this 
not import the destruction of the old legal order, or was the first Republic just Dr 
Nkrumah.  He adds that,the fact that a revolution is not a mere change in the 
personnel  of the government is borne out by the fact that it can be staged from within 
the government, by the ruler himself, as happened in Germany in 1933 when Hitler, as 
Chancellor, subverted the Constitution to assume absolute powers, or in Uganda in 
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1966 when Prime Minister Milton Obote abrogated the Constitution and declared 
himself executive president. 
 
2.6 Grenada: 
 
On 13 March 1979, the New Jewel Movement overthrew the government of Eric Gairy 
and seized power under the leadership of Maurice Bishop.  If formed the People’s 
Revolutionary Government.  The 1973 Constitution was suspended.  The existing 
Supreme Court was abolished and the Supreme Court of Grenada was established by 
People’s Law No. 4.  People’s Law No. 84 abolished appeals to the Judicial Committee 
of the Privy Council.  On 19 October 1983, Maurice Bishop and others were killed when 
the Revolutionary Military Council seized power. 
 
43. S.K. Date-Bah ‘Jurisprudence Day in Court in Ghana (1971) 20 ICLQ 315  
44. Professor B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, London, Hurst:  1973 at 231 - 232 
 
 
In Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions,45 the applicants had been charged with 
murder and were awaiting trial in the High Court of Grenada.  They brought an 
application challenging the competence of the court to hear the charges on the basis 
that the court brought into existence by People’s Law No. 4 had been created in 
breach of the Constitution and was, accordingly unconstitutional and illegal.   
 
The court held that the situation at the time of the seizure of power by the People’s 
Revolutionary Government and the effectiveness of its rule during four and a half years 
in power validated the legislative enactments of that government as it was firmly 
established as legitimate.  It held further that this legitimacy extended back to cover 
legislation enacted by the regime from the inception of control.  The application was 
therefore dismissed.  The appellants appealed to the Court of Appeal.46  Their appeal 
was dismissed.  Haynes P. suggested an approach that should be adopted in dealing 
with Kelsen’s pure theory when he said:47 
 
‘Kelsen’s Jurisprudential theory may be a neat, tautly-argued analytical system that cannot easily be 
faulted on logical grounds so far as its internal consistency is concerned, nonetheless before such a 
logical system is applied to the solution of an actual case the Judges are entitled to consider, whether, in 
addition to its logicality, the consequences of applying the Kelsenite viewpoint are socially desirable or 
not.  This approach one may characterize as that of sociological jurisprudence, as distinct from the pure 
analytical jurisprudence, epitomized by Kelsen’s work.’ 
 
2.7 Lesotho: 
 
On 20 January 1986 a coup d’ etat was effected by the Lesotho Paramilitary Force.  In 
Mokotso v H.M. King Moshoeshoe II and Others,48 one Thabo Mokotso applied to the 
High Court for an order that constitutional government and Parliamentary democracy 
under the Constitution of 1966 should be restored.  Cullinan C.J. said that it was a 
notorious fact that news of the coup d’ etat was greeted with jubilation by the people 
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in the streets of Maseru.  He held the revolutionary regime was in effective control.  
There was no other government or faction in opposition.  He observed that it had 
governed effectively for two and a half years.  Kelsen was therefore applied in 
Lesotho, when the court held the government which came into power on 20 January 
1986, was the lawful government of the Kingdom of Lesotho and its legislation had 
been legitimated ab initio.49 
 
 
 
 
45. 1985 LRC (Const) 127 
46. Mitchell V. Director of Public Prosecutions 1986 LRC (Const.) 35  
47. 1986 LRC at 56  
48. 1989 LRC (Const.) 24 
49. Mokotso at 147  
 
 
2.8 South Africa 
 
The Mokotso case was relied on in the case of Matanzima v President of the Republic 
of Transkei.50  In this case the court held that a revolutionary government acquired 
legitimacy when it is firmly established, there being no real danger that it will itself be 
ousted from power and when its administration is effective in that the people by and 
large have acquiesced in and are behaving in conformity with its mandates. 
 
In the case of Mangope v van der Walt,51 the respondents were the joint 
administrators appointed by the South African Government and the Transitional 
Executive Council to govern Bophuthatswana for the time being in the place of the 
applicant who had been the President of the homeland.  The applicant sought an order 
that the appointment of joint administrators of Bophuthatswana was of no force and 
effect within the territory of Bophuthatswana.  The court held that the doctrine of 
successful revolution was applicable.  The administration was effective because the 
majority of the people were behaving in conformity with the new administration.52 
 
2.9 Conclusion  
 
Some of the views expressed in Bhutto’s case can be read to mean that, the court 
called upon to decide the question should take into consideration both the reason why 
the old Constitutional government was overthrown and the nature and character of the 
new legal order, was the motivation mere power grabbing or was it a rebellion or 
example against oppression or corruption or ineptitude?  And is the new legal order a 
just one?  In this case there was a total rejection of Kelsen because the very basis of 
the Pakistan’s state does not accommodate that.  In Pakistan, therefore, necessity is 
the only basis on which the usurpation of power will be condoned.  
 
In Seychelles, Uganda and Grenada, Kelsen has been accepted as a basis for 
legitimacy but in these countries it was clear that the new regime had effective 
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control.  In Seychelles and Grenada enough time had elapsed for Kelsen to be applied 
safely. 
 
In Rhodesia one had a gradual shift from necessity to successful revolution with the 
passage of time.  In Lesotho and South Africa Kelsen seems to have been applied 
without much question. 
 
It is submitted that the application of Kelsen results in recognition of a revolutionary 
government by a municipal court.  In the case Madzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke N.O. 
and Another.53  MacDonald J.A. held that a municipal court recognises the legality of 
the only law-making and law enforcing government functioning for the time being 
within the state.  From the point of view of a municipal court a government is either 
lawful or not lawful.   
 
50. 1989(4) S.A. 989 (T.K.) 
51. 1994(3) S.A. 850 (BGD) 
52. 1994(3) S.A. at 866  
53. 1968(2) S.A. 376 at 415 B-C (A-D) 
 
 
He recognized the then government as the only existing law-making and law enforcing 
government within the state of Rhodesia and enforced laws passed in accordance with 
the 1965 Constitution.  Although every Judge in the case came to a different 
conclusion his idea in this point cannot be assailed. 
 
How long does the unconstitutional regime have to survive before Kelsen can be 
applied?  The duration of time appears to be irrelevant. 
 
The criterion for recognition of the unconstitutional regime was stated in Mitchell v. 
DPP, where the court of Appeal of Grenada concluded that for a revolutionary 
government to be considered legal, the revolution should not only be successful and 
the new government firmly established, but there should be general obedience based 
on consent and approval rather than fear and the new regime should not be 
oppressive or undemocratic.54 
 
A conclusion can be drawn that where Kelsen has been applied, the government is 
accorded total recognition and total recognition is accorded to a revolutionary 
government where that government and the area over which it has effective control is 
a state according to the criteria of statehood in international law.  That means it must 
have a territory, population and government.55  Partial recognition occurs where only 
the acts of the revolutionary government are recognized but not the revolutionary 
government per se because it is necessary to do so in order to maintain or ensure civil 
order, and the doctrine of State necessity is applied.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE NECESSITY PRINCIPLE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter the application of the Kelsenian theory in the event of 
a revolution was discussed.  This chapter discusses the second choice that 
courts have when they are called upon to decide on the validity of post 
revolution law. 
 
The doctrine of necessity is commonly applied as a defence in criminal law.  
Burchell and Hunt say that in criminal law an act to be justified on the ground 
of necessity, the act has to meet the following requirements: 
 
(a) ‘a legal interest of the accused must have been endangered 
(b) by a threat which had commenced or was imminent but which was 
(c) not caused by the accused’s fault and, in addition, it must have been 
(d) necessary for the accused to avert the danger, and  
(e) the means used for this purpose must, have been reasonable in the 
circumstances.’1 
 
The defence of necessity arises when, confronted with a choice between 
suffering some evil and breaking the letter of the law in order to avoid it, the 
accused chooses the latter alternative.  Necessity relates to the unlawfulness 
or otherwise of the accused’s act so that where the defence succeeds the 
accused is acquitted on the ground that his act was justified by the necessity 
of the occasion. 
 
The doctrine of necessity is not easily applied as shown by those cases 
dealing with killing in circumstances of necessity.  In the case of R. v Dudley 
and Stephens,2 in this matter Brooks and the deceased, a seventeen year old 
boy, were in an open boat in the South Atlantic.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Burchell and Hunt, South African Crimininal Law and Procedure Volume I, 1970, 
Juta And Co Limited, Cape Town at 285 
2. (1884) 14 QBD 273 
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After 20 days in the water, Dudley with Stephen’s assent, Brooks objecting, 
killed the boy and all three fed off his body for four days.  They were rescued 
on the 5th day after the killing, and charged with murder.  In this case the 
weakest, the youngest, the most unresisting, was chosen.  Was it more 
necessary to kill him than one of the grown men? The answer must be no.  
They were found guilty of murder.  An act of necessity usually results in the 
infliction of harm upon an innocent person. 
 
3.2 Constitutional Law Position: 
 
The doctrine of necessity is used as a justification for an action otherwise 
unlawful but necessary to preserve the life of the state or society.3   On the 
face of it, the doctrine would appear to be inconsistent with the law.  Glanville 
Williams has put the point cogently: 
 
 ‘What it comes to is this, that the defence of necessity involves a choice of other 
lesser evil.  It requires a judgement of values, on adjudication between competing 
goals and a sacrifice of one to the other.  The language of necessity disguises the 
selection of values that is really involved.  If this is so, is there any legal basis for the 
defence?  The law itself enshrines values, and the judge is sworn to uphold the law.  
By what right can the judge declare some value not expressed in the law, to be 
superior to the law?  How in particular, can he do this in the face of the words of a 
statute?  Does not the defence of necessity wear the appearance of an appeal to the 
judge against the law’4 
 
The doctrine does not operate from outside the law, but is implied in it as an 
intergral part thereof.  The defence of necessity like other defences do not 
negate the law, it is part of the law. 
 
Glanville Williams adds that the defence of necessity is an implied exception 
to particular rules of law.5 It does not abrogate express law, but can only 
qualify it for the purpose of averting the threatening danger.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. Mitchell and others v. Director of Public Presecutions and Another 1986 LRC 
(Const) 127 
4. Glenville Williams, ‘The defence of necessity’ (1953) 6 Current Legal Problems, 
216 at 224 
5. Glanville Williams at 224 
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The writer here is indicating that a law does not need an express provision 
that mentions defences as defences are implied to any prohibition, a legal 
system has a number of defences and these are known.  If the defence of 
necessity has been raised successfully in court that does not mean that the 
law has been repealed. 
 
De Smith observed that the necessity must be proportionate to the evil to be 
averted and acceptance of the principle does not normally imply total 
abdication from judicial review or acquiescence in the suprression of the legal 
order. It has been recognised as an implied exception to the letter of the 
constitution.6 
 
The moral attitude is expressed in Cicero’s words that it is better to receive 
than to inflict an injury (Accipere quam facere injuriarum proerstet), and also 
the moral question whether the end can justify the means.  The end can 
justify the means on three conditions. 
 
(i) ‘that the end be good. 
(ii) that the means chosen be either purely good or if evil, having less evil in them 
than on a balance there is of real good in the end. 
(iii) That they have more of good in them, or less of evil, as the case may be 
 than any other, by the employment of which the end might have been 
 attained.’ 7 
 
The rationale of the doctrine is that, in an emergency imperilling public order, 
or public security, the safety of the people is the supreme law.  But this 
supreme law of necessity, the organs of the state are entitled, in the face of 
such an emergency, to take all appropriate actions even in deviation from the 
express provisions of the constitution, in order to safeguard law and order 
and preserve the state and the society.8 Its application is, however, subject to 
the following conditions: 
 
(i) ‘An imperative necessity arising from an imminent and extreme danger 
affecting the safety of the state or society;  
(ii) Action taken to meet the emergency must be inevitable in the sense of 
 being the only remedy.’ 
 
 
 
 
6. De Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, (5th ed) London, Pelican Books 
1985  at 80 
7. Glanville Williams, at 225 
8. Glanville Williams, at 225 
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(iii) it must be proportionate to the necessity, that it must be reasonably warranted 
by the danger which it was intended to avert; 
(iv) it must be of a temporary character limited to the duration of the exceptional 
circumstances; 
(v) the temporary incapacitation of the authority which normally has the competence 
to act.’9 
 
The constitutional history of England shows, the civil war which brought about 
the defeat, trial and execution of Charles in 164910 and also resulted in 
Glorious Revolution of 1688 which dethroned James II.11  Chitty refers to 
both episodes as instances where Parliament assembled in an illegal manner, 
that is, without the summons of the King.  In both these instances the 
necessity of the case rendered it necessary for the Parliament to meet as they 
did, there being no King to call them together and necessity supersedes all 
law.12 
 
3.3 The Pakistan cases: 
 
The doctrine of necessity in public law as a principle of revolutionary legality 
was used in Pakistan.  In the case of Special Reference,13  I shall show an 
example of the breakdown of the government.  During the chaotic opening 
years of its existence as an independent state Pakistan found itself, in 1955, 
to be without a legislature at all.  The Constituent Assembly that had sat and 
wrangled since independance had been dissolved and, apparently, there was 
no legal provision for its reconvention.  Meanwhile there was urgent need for 
certain essential legislation to replace certain earlier enactments found to be 
invalid.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Professor B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the emergent states, London: Hurst, 1973 at 181 
10. Gretchen Carpenter, Introduction to South African Constitutional Law, 1987, Durban, Butterworths:  at 
39 
11. Gretchen Carpenter at  41 
12. Chitty, prerogatives of the crown, 182 0 ED at 283-286 
13. No. 1 of 1955 (1955) IF CR - 439 
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The Governor-General, therefore, purported to make provision by 
proclamation both for the reconstitution of the Constitutuent Assembly and, 
for the required legislation pending final decision thereon by that Assembly.  
This exercise of legislative power by the Governor-General was held to be 
valid by the court.  The Federal Supreme Court held that in the special 
circumstances the Governor-General had the power during the interim period, 
under the common law of necessity, temporarily to validate those laws and to 
do so retrospectively.  It was held that the Governor-General had acted in 
order to avert an impending disaster and to prevent the state and society 
from dissolution.   
 
Cornelius J. and Muhammed Sherif J. returned a minority judgement.  They 
maintained that the common law of necessity is confined to cases where in 
times of war or other national disaster the executive might interfere with 
private rights but that it has never been extended to changes in constitutional 
law. 
 
In the case of Jilani v the Government of the Punjab,14 the Court of Appeal 
was required to consider whether the doctrine enunciated in S.V. Dosso was 
correct and, even if correct, whether it applied to the facts and circumstances 
in which Field Marshall Ayub Khan had transferred power to General Agha 
Muhammad Yahya Khan and whether all legislative and executive acts 
performed by General Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan, including the imposition 
of Martial Law and the promulgation of Martial law Regulations and Orders, 
were illegal. 
 
The court decided that the orders before it were not only illegitimate but were 
also incapable of being maintained on the ground of necessity.  The judge 
conceded that recourse had to be taken to the doctrine of necessity where 
the ignoring of it would result in disastrous consequences to the body politic 
and upset the social order itself. 
 
The judge did not accept the view that the doctrine of necessity is for 
validating the illegal acts of usurper’s.  The judge was of the opinion that this 
doctrine can be invoked in aid only after the court has come to the conclusion 
that the acts of the usurpers were illegal and illegitimate.  It is only then that 
the question arises as to how many of the usurpers acts, legislative or 
otherwise, should be condoned or maintained, notwithstanding their illegality, 
in the wider pubic interest.   
 
 
14. PLD 1972  SC  139 
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The judge called this a principle of condonation and not legitimisation.  The 
law of necessity can validate or condone only such administrative and 
legistlative acts as are reasonably required and needed for the orderly 
running of the state.15 
 
It is submitted that the other cases I have read do no raise this notion of 
condonation.  Whenever the doctrine of necessity is applicable it legitimises 
the acts of usurpers. 
 
It was the existence of exceptional circumstances in the case of Bhutto v.  
The Chief of Pakistan Army and Federation of Pakistan,16 that influenced the 
army to take action in order to protect or preserve some vital function of the 
State.  On 17th March 1977, general elections were held.  The Pakistan 
People’s Party won the elections.  The opposition immediately renounced the 
elections as rigged.  Protest demonstrations and strikes gradually built up to 
widespread rioting in which the deaths of 300 people were reported.   
 
Talks between the Prime Minister and the opposition failed.  There was no 
other course of action reasonably available.  The armed forces stepped in on 
5th July 1977.  The aim of the army was to organise free and fair elections 
which were to be held in October 1977.  The court held that the exceptional 
circumstances prior to 5th July 1977 fully attracted the doctrine of necessity 
and of the maxim salus populi suprema lex.  The action that was taken by the 
army was regarded as valid. 
 
The court applied the law of necessity.  The court held that this was not a 
case where the old legal order had been completely suppressed or destroyed, 
but merely a case of a constitutional deviation for a temporary period and for 
a specific and limited objective, namely, the restoration of law and order and 
normality in the country, and the earliest possible holding of free and fair 
elections for the purpose of restoration of democratic institutions under the 
1973 Constitution.17 
 
It was a situation for which the constitution provided no solution and the 
armed forces had, therefore, to invervene to save the country from chaos and 
bloodshed to safeguard its integrity and sovereignty, and to separate the 
warring factions which had brought the country to the brink of disaster. 
 
 
 
15. Jilani V.  The Government of the Punjab  1972 SC 139 
16. PLD 1977 SC 670 
17. Bhutto at page 670 
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It is submitted that the imposition of Martial Law, therefore, stood validated 
by the doctrine of necessity, and the Chief Martial Law Administrator was 
entitled to perform all such acts and promulgate all legislative measures.  
That conduct fell within the scope of the law of necessity. 
 
3.4 The Position in Cyprus: 
 
This can be illustrated by the case of the Attorney-General of the Republic of 
Cyprus v. Ibrahim,18  The report of this case is not available to the writer but 
some account of it is given in the case of Mitchell and others v. Director of 
Public Prosecutions and another 1987 LCR 127.  The Cyprus Constitution of 
1960 gave to the Turkish Community 18 per cent of the right to participate in 
all important offices of the state, executive, legislative and judicial.  That 
meant 18 per cent of all members of the legislative were to be Turks.  Their 
rights were entrenched in the Constitution, some of which could not be 
amended at all.  Article 133.1 provided for a Supreme Constitutional Court 
composed of a Greek, a Turk and a neutral judge as President with two votes.  
Article 153.1 provided for a high court of justice composed of two Greek 
judges, one Turkish judge with a neutral judge as President with two votes.19  
 
In 1964, Cyprus was a deeply divided society.  The Turkish Cypriots had 
withdrawn from participation in the machinery of Government.  The neutral 
President had resigned, with no available replacements.  The administration 
of justice was thrown into chaos.  For some months Turkish judges did not 
attend their courts.  The Supreme Constitutional Court had not met since 
August 1963 and by July 1964 over 400 cases were pending.  Both the 
Supreme Constitutional Court and the High Court of Justice had ceased to 
function.20 
 
In July 1964, the House of Representatives, sitting without its Turkish 
members passed a law to establish a new Supreme Court to exercise the 
functions previously vested in the Supreme Constitutional Court and the High 
Court.  This law (no. 33 of 1964 title unknown) was inconsistent with 
important articles of the Constitution and which articles were declared to be 
unalterable.   
 
 
 
 
 
18. 1964  CRL 195 
19. 1987  LCR  at 127 
20. Mitchell    at 127 
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Moreover, the Constitution required laws to be promulgated by both the Vice 
President as well as the President, and to be published in Turkish as well as 
Greek.  This was not done.  It was an unconstitutional law, enacted and 
published in an unconstitutional manner, by an unconstitutionally constituted 
Parliament.21 
 
In August 1964 four persons committed for trial at Assizes were granted bail 
by a district judge.  The Attorney-General appealed to the Supreme Court 
against this order.  Three judges chosen under the 1964 law sat to hear the 
appeal.  Counsel for the respondents took objection to the legality of the 
proceedings.  His objection was that the court had no legal existence and no 
power to adjudicate as the law creating it was unconstitutional and a nullity.  
The Attorney-General submitted it was validly enacted on the legal foundation 
of the law of necessity to preserve the administration of justice, law and 
order.  The appeal was allowed and the order for bail set aside. 
 
In his judgement Triantafyllides J, held that the legal doctrine of necessity 
should be read into the provisions of the written constitution and must be 
deemed to be part of the scheme of the constitutional order in Cyprus so as 
to enable the interests of the country where the constitution does not contain 
adequate express provision for the purpose.  The judge went on to say that if 
the administration of justice could no longer be secured in a manner which 
would not be inconsistent with the Constitution, then the House of 
Representatives, elected by the people, should be empowered to take such 
necessary steps as are warranted, by the doctrine of necessity, in the 
exigencies of the situation.22 
 
Josephides J. said that he was of the opinion that the doctrine of necessity in 
public law is, in reality, the acceptance of necessity as a source of authority 
for acting in a manner not regulated by law but required in prevailing 
circumstances, by supreme public interest, for the salvation of the state and 
its people.23  In such cases salus populi becomes supreme lex.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
21. Mitchell   at 127 
22. Mitchell  at 127 
23. Mitchell  at 127 
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The judge held that the government had to choose between two alternatives, 
either to comply with the strict letter of the Constitution that is, cross its arms 
and do nothing but witness the complete paralysis of the judicial power, 
which is one of the three pillars of the state, or to deviate from the letter of 
the Constitution, which had been rendered inoperative by the force of events, 
in order to do what was imperatively and inevitably necessary to save the 
judicial power temporarily until return to normal conditions so that the whole 
state structure could not crumble. 24 
 
Vassiliades J. reached the same conclusion and stressed the importance of a 
properly functioning judicial system, for the life of the state, for the existence 
of the community, and for the daily life of every person living within the 
territorial boundaries of the Republic. 
 
3.5 The Rhodesian Crisis: 
 
In Rhodesia, on November 5, 1965, a state of emergency was proclaimed by 
the Governor and emergency regulations were made, under which the 
Minister of Justice, Mr. Lardner-Burke, ordered one Daniel Madzimbamuto to 
be detained in prison on the ground that he intended to commit acts in 
Rhodesia which were likely to endanger the public safety, disturb or interfere 
with public order or interfere with the maintanance of any essential services.  
Under the Constitution of 1961, a state of emergency could last only for three 
months in the first instance, but could be prolonged by a resolution of the 
legislative assembly.   
 
The three months period of the state of emergency expired on February 4, 
1966.  The Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDIi) having been 
declared, the legislative assembly could not lawfully resolve to prolong the 
state of emergency.  Nevertheless, the officer administering the government, 
acting under the 1965 Constitution, prolonged the state of emergency and 
made fresh emergency regulations by virtue of which the detention of 
Madzimbamuto was continued.  His wife in Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-
Burker,25 then instituted proceedings in the High Court of Rhodesia 
challenging the legality of her husband’s continued detention after February 
4, 1966. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24. Mitchell   at 127 
25. 1968 (2) S.A. 284  RAD 
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The High Court, while affirming the unlawful character of the rebel 
constitution and government nevertheless upheld as valid the regime’s 
emergency powers and regulations and consequently Madzimbamuto’s 
continued detention under them.  The ground for this finding was necessity, 
which the court held arose from the need to avoid chaos and vacuum in law. 
 
Madzimbamuto’s wife noted an appeal to the Appellate Division,26 Fieldsend 
A.J. A. held that the necessity relied on was the vacuum which would result 
from a refusal to give validity to the acts and legislation of the post UDI 
authorities in continuing to provide for the everyday requirements of the 
inhabitants of Rhodesia over a period of two years.   
 
If such acts were to be without validity there would be no effective means of 
providing money for the hospitals, the police, or the courts, of making 
essential by-laws for new townships or of safeguarding the country and its 
people in any emergency which might occur, to mention but a few of the 
numerous matters which require attention in the complex and modern state.  
Without constant attention to such matters, the whole machinery of the 
administration would break down, to be replaced by chaos, and the welfare of 
the inhabitants of all races would be grievously affected. 
 
It was emphasised that the application of the doctrine of necessity to bestow 
validity upon certain acts of the rebel government was subject to the 
qualification that: 
 
(a) ‘such acts must be directed to and be reasonably required for the ordinary 
running of the state. 
(b) the rights of citizens under the 1961 constitution were not defeated; and 
(c) there was no consideration of public policy to preclude the court from upholding 
such an act, for instance, if it were intended to or did in fact in its operation 
directly further or entrench the usurpation of power by the rebel government.’
27 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
26. 1968 (2) S.A. 284  RAD 
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One of the requirements in criminal law for the doctrine of necessity is that 
the situation giving rise to necessity must not have been caused by the 
accused’s fault.  It is submitted that the vacuum in government which 
threatened chaos in the society was entirely of the making of the rebel 
government.  It was a direct consequence of their illegal seizure of 
independence.  It can scarcely be for them to set up their own wrongdoing as 
creating a necessity for their continued violation of the law and the 
Constitution.  The blame for the vacuum lies at the door of those who created 
it through the illegal action of the revolution itself, and it is for them to end 
the vacuum by returning to constitutional rule. 
 
The doctrine of necessity is subject to the condition that it must be of a 
temporary character limited to the duration of the exceptional circumstances.  
Ian Smith was to stay in power for an indefinite period and with no intention 
to give up political power.  A measure of a permanent nature does not meet 
the requirements for the application of the doctrine.  The doctrine envisages 
that the measures taken must be of a temporary character. 
 
The wife of Madzimbamuto further appealed to the Privy Council.  The 
majority of their lordships of the Privy Council, 28 held that to accord validity 
to the acts of the rebel regime on the ground of necessity would be to enable 
the doctrine to override and nullify the legislation (1961 Constitution) of the 
lawful sovereign, which not only transferred all political power in Rhodesia to 
the British Government but also declared void any law made, business 
transacted, steps taken or function exercised in contravention of the 
legislation. 
 
3.6 The Madras Crisis: 
 
In the case of RV Stratton and others,29  The report of this case is not 
available to the writer, but some account of it is given in the Mitchell and 
others V Director of Public Prosecutions and another 1987 LRC at 127.  The 
accused, formerly members of the Governor’s Council of Madras, were 
charged with unlawfully imprisoning Lord Pigot, the Governor, and unlawfully 
usurping the power of governing Madras.   
 
 
 
 
 
28. Madzimbomuto V. Lardner Burke 1969 (1) A.C.  645 
29. 21 State Trials  1045. 
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It appears from the report of the case that Madras, in terms of its 
Constitution, was governed by a council, presided over by a Governor, who 
alone had power to summon the Council, and whose presence at sessions 
thereof was essential to the validity of its proceedings. 
 
The Council was not a merely advisory body.  Its decisions, by way of 
majority vote, were binding, the Governor having merely a deliberative vote, 
and a casting vote in the event of equality.  A dispute having arisen, in 
connection with certain instructions to be given to the Commander of the 
garrison, between the Governor, on the one hand, and a majority of the 
Council, on the other, the Governor adopted the arbitrary and clearly unlawful 
course of excluding sufficient of the Council members from the proceedings of 
that body to give him a majority in the remaining rump.  Lord Mensfield, 
compared this arbitrary proceeding to Cromwell’s historic purge of the House 
of Commons.     
 
The question was, whether the illegality of the Governor’s conduct justified, in 
law, the setting up by the accused of their own illegal government.  The court 
held that such justification could rest only on what the judge termed 
imminent, extreme, necessity which would be present if there was no other 
remedy to apply for redress.  The act must be done with a view of preserving 
the society and themselves, with intent of preserving the whole. 30 
 
The accused were convicted, for the evidence disclosed no imminent menace 
to the maintenance of Madras, or to the lives and property of its inhabitants, 
such as might justify the accused in resorting to self-help instead of seeking 
legal redress. 
 
3.7 The Nigerian Crisis: 
 
On 15 January 1966 the Nigerian army staged a coup d’etat.  Its operations in 
the Northern Capital, Kaduna, overthrew the regional government of Sir 
Ahmedu Bello, who was killed when the soldiers stormed his official 
residence.  In the West and Lagos, the operations were only partially 
successful.   
 
 
 
 
 
30. 21 State Trials at 1224 
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The head of the Western Regional Government, Chief Akintola, was killed, 
and the Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakan Tafawa Balewa, and his minister 
of Finance, Chief Festus Ilatic–Ebo, were kidnapped and taken to an unknown 
destination, where some days later their bodies were discovered by 
villagers.31 
 
In a short but historic speech on January 16, the Acting President, Dr. Nwafor 
Orizu announced to the anxious nation that he had been advised by the 
Council of Ministers that they had come to the unanimous decision voluntarily 
to hand over the administration of the country to the armed forces of the 
Republic with immediate effect, and expressed the hope that the new 
administration would ensure the people of stability of the Federal Republic of 
Nigeria and win their full co-operation.  He then called upon the General 
Officer commanding the armed forces to inform the nation of the policy of the 
new administration.32 
 
The President lacked power under the express provisions of the Constitution 
to cede sovereignty to the armed forces.  Was the hand-over, then, justified 
by necessity? 
 
The doctrine of necessity requires, not only that the action must be justified 
by the existence of the exceptional circumstances, but also that the authority 
competent to take the necessary action must have been temporarily 
incapacitated.  There was in fact such temporary incapacitation of the 
competent authority, because on 15 January 1966 the army staged a coup 
d’etat.  As a result the Federal Parliament and the regional legislatures could 
not function.  The premiers of both the North and West had been killed in the 
early hours of January 15.  With their deaths all the other ministerial 
appointments in the two regions were, in accordance with the Constitution, 
vacated.  The army was determined to topple the government. 
 
It is submitted that since the object is to save the state and society from 
destruction, if this can only be done by abdicating sovereign power to a body 
best able to achieve the object, then abdication of sovereignty ought to be 
within the permissible ambit of the doctrine. 
 
 
 
 
 
31. Abiola Ozo, “ The search for a grundnorm in Nigeria,”  1971 Volume 20, International and comperative 
Law Quartely  at 120 
32. Abiola Ozo at 123 
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In the case of E.O. Lakanmi Kikelomo Ola v The Attorney General (Western 
State) and others, 33 the military government passed Decree No. 1 of 1966 
which authorised the investigation of the assets of certain public officers.  The 
West Nigerian military government enacted a similar law the following year, 
which extended to persons other than public officers.  That was Decree no. 
45 of 1968.  The appellants contended that their assets had been wrongly 
confisticated under Decree No. 45 of 1968 which was invalid and ultra vires 
the Constitution of the Federation of 1963 because, the Federal Military 
Government was only an interim Military Government, to which power had 
been transferred by the old civilian regime only for a limited purpose of 
restoring law and order and after which power should be handed back to 
them.  The Federal Military Government could only make laws going beyond 
the purpose of restoring law and order if such laws could be justified under 
the doctrine of necessity. 
 
The respondent argued that a revolution had occured and that the Federal 
Military Government, therefore according to the Kelsenian principles, had an 
unfettered power to rule by decree.  The Supreme Court Declared decree 
No.45 of 1968 invalid as contrary to the Republican Constitution of 1963, 
thereby allowing the appeal of the appellants. 
 
For the sake of clarity, the ratio decidendi of the judgement in the Supreme 
Court can be set out as follows.  The events of January 15, 1966, did not 
amount to a revolution but a mere offer or invitation to the armed forces to 
form an interim military government, making it clear that only certain sections 
of the 1963 Republican Constitution were to be suspended and the offer was 
duly accepted by the armed forces.  The constitutional interim government 
which came into being by the wishes of the representatives of the people, 
and whose object was to uphold the Constitution, could only derogate from 
that Constitution if the derogation was justified under the doctrine of 
necessity. 
 
It is submitted that the Nigerian Supreme Court was mistaken in its 
assessment not only of the factual events but also of the legal situation.  The 
view that government was transferred to the army was misconceived because 
the 1963 Republican Constitution made no provision for such a transfer of 
power.  The events which transpired between the group of Ministers and the 
armed forces could not be regarded as a voluntary transfer of power but an 
unavoidable abdication of power by the remaining ministers left in the 
cabinet. 
 
 
33. S C 58/69 OF April 24, 1970 
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3.8 The Grenada Revolution: 
 
The position in Grenada is demonstrated by the events that took place on 13 
March 1979 when the New Jewel Movement, the political party in opposition 
to the then ruling Grenada United Labour Party staged a coup d’ etat while 
Prime Minister, Sir Eric Gairy, was abroad. 34 Maurice Bishop, the leader of 
the usurping party dissolved parliament.  The ministers of the overthrown 
Government were excluded from their offices.  The usurpers assumed all 
excecutive and legislative powers.  They declared the suspension of the 
Constitution and that all other existing laws would continue in force.  Maurice 
Bishop called this new administration a People’s Revolutionary Government. 
 
There was a second coup d’etat, when on 19 October 1983, Maurice Bishop 
along with some of his Ministers were murdered.  A Revolutionary Military 
Council then assumed power.  Two pieces of legislation were continued in 
force, that is, the People’s Laws no’s 14 and 84.  The People’s Law no 84 of 
the 10th November 1979 declared that all appeals to the Privy Council were 
abolished.  All criminal indictments were tried by a jury in the High Court 
created by People’s Laws No. 4 and No.14. 
 
During August 1984, Mitchell and others were committed by a magistrate to 
stand trial for murder before the then High Court of Grenada.  They 
challenged the legal existence, constitutionality and validity of the High Court 
established by People’s Laws No’s 4 and 14 of the People’s Revolutionary 
Government.  The High Court, they alleged, had no jurisdiction to try them, 
as all these laws were legally nullities and so void.  The only court which 
could legally try them was the High Court established by the Courts Order 
1967, the court in force just before the revolution happened. 
 
The respondents did not deny the unconstitutionality of the court vis-a vis the 
Constitution of 1973.  But, they contended, when the new High Court was 
constituted, it had validity on the legal foundation of the law of necessity.  
The necessity, they submitted, was created by the fact that the Supreme 
Court of Grenada and the West Indies Associated States had ceased to 
function and had to be replaced to preserve the administration of justice, law 
and order. 
 
 
 
 
 
34. Mitchell and Others v Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 1987 LRC  
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The applicants contended that the doctrine of necessity was, in the 
circumstances, inapplicable and even if it did apply to validate the court, such 
validity would have expired with the overthrow of the regime.  The court held 
that the doctrine of necessity was capable of application to validate 
unconstitutional legislation by a constitutional representative government in 
parliament if the requisite conditions are satisfied.  These requisite conditions 
were stated as follows 
 
(i) ‘An imperative necessity must arise because of the existence of exceptional 
circumstances not provided for in the constitution, for immediate action to be taken 
to protect or preserve some vital function to the state 
(ii) There must be no other course of action reasonably available. 
(iii) Any such action must be reasonably necessary in the interest of peace, order and 
good government; but it must not do more than is necessary or legislate beyond 
that. 
(iv) It must not impair the just rights of citizens under the constitution. 
(v) It must not be one, the sole effect and intention of which is to consolidate or 
strengthen the revolution as such.’35 
 
The ruling was that People’s Laws No.4 and 14 stood validated on the legal 
basis of necessity. 
 
3.9 Conclusion: 
 
It is submitted that in the jurisdictions with written constitutions of the 
Westminster model the courts recognise that the constitution does not and 
cannot provide for every political situation that might arise.  The doctrine of 
necessity supplements what a legal instrument would have provided to deal 
with an eventuality it did not contemplate.  This is evident from the 
experience of Rhodesia when Mr. Ian Smith declared Unilateral Declaration of 
Independence as a result there were two Constitutions for this country with 
some citizens owing allegiance to the old Constitution while other citizens 
owed allegiance to the new Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
35. Mitchell and other  V. Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 1986  LRC 
(Cont.) at 88-89 
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A written constitution is an instrument of government, and the relevant 
implication in the event of breakdown of the organs it establishes would seem 
necessarily to be not that anarchy should prevail, which is contrary to the 
fundamental purpose of any constitution, but that recognition should be 
accorded to such of the acts of the illegitimate authorities that are necessary 
at least to preserve a functioning society pending the restoration of 
constitutional government.  Hence some authorities have applied the doctrine 
of necessity. 
 
The doctrine of necessity has been used to validate unconstitutional 
administrative and legislative acts done and passed by a constitutional 
functionary acting completely outside his constitutional powers.  In the case 
of Special Reference,36  Pakistan was without a legislature.  The Governor-
General then exercised legislative power.  The Federal Supreme Court held 
that in the special circumstances, the Governor General had the power during 
the interim period, under the common law of necessity, temporarily to 
validate those laws and to do so retrospectively.  It was held that the 
Governor General had acted in order to avert an impending disaster and to 
prevent the state and society from dissolution. 
 
The doctrine of necessity was considered where a wholly unconstitutional 
body exercised de facto the sovereign executive and legislative powers of the 
state.  In the case of Madzimbamuto v Lardner-Burke,37  Fieldsend J.A, held 
that necessity was invoked because there was a vacuum which would result 
from a refusal to give validity to the acts and legislation of the authorities as 
the authorities have continued to provide for the everyday requirements of 
the inhabitants of Rhodesia over a period of two years.   
 
If such acts were not accorded legal validity, there would be no effective 
means of providing money for the hospitals, the police, or the courts, or 
making essential by-laws for new townships or of safeguarding the country 
and its people in any emergency which might occur, to mention but a few of 
the numerous matters which require attention in the complex and modern 
state.  Without constant attention to such matters, the whole machinery of 
the administration would break down, to be replaced by chaos, and the 
welfare of the inhabitants of all races would be grievously affected. 
 
 
 
 
36. Special Reference No.1 of (1955) IFCR 439 
37. 1968 (2) S.A. 284  RAD 
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The doctrine of necessity was used to validate legislative acts by a parliament 
unconstitutionally constituted.  In the case of the Attorney General of the 
Republic of Cyprus v. Ibrahim, Triantafylides J. held that if the administration 
of justice could no longer be secured in a manner which would not be 
inconsistent with the constitution, then the House of Representatives, elected 
by the people should be empowered to take such necessary steps as are 
warranted, by the doctrine of necessity, in the exigencies of the situation. 
 
The doctrine of necessity has been used to validate acts by an Army Chief as 
Chief Martial Law Administrator.  In the case of Bhuto, v the Chief of Pakistan 
Army and Federation of Pakistan,39 the court applied the law of necessity.  
Although there was a complete take over by the army, the court held that this 
was merely a case of a constitutional deviation for a temporary period and for 
a specific and limited objective, namely, the restoration of law and order and 
normality in the country, and the earliest possible holding of free and fair 
elections for the purpose of restoration of democratic institutions under the 
1973 Constitution. 
 
 
39. Bhutto V. The Chief of Pakistan Army and Federation of Pakistan  PLD 1977 SC 670 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
 
The judges are faced with choices after a coup d’ etat: whether to resign, whether 
to remain in office asserting the pre-revolutionary Constitution, deriving their 
jurisdiction from that Constitution and denying validity to any of the revolutionary 
actions, whether to remain in office but to co-operate with the new authorities, 
whether to remain but to apply the doctrine of necessity validating those actions 
of the revolutionary authorities which the maintenance of law and order dictates, 
or whether to identify themselves with the new authorities and to sit on courts of 
the revolution. 
 
J.W. Harris observes that it is not consonant with the role of a judge who has 
been appointed under one Constitution to accept the authority of any other 
constitution.1  The point is that judges are normally considered to be upholders of 
Constitutions not co-operators in revolutions.  Ought not loyalty to the Constitution 
under which a person was appointed as judge outweigh what the legal science 
provides?  This means that a judge should be bound by the Constitution and not 
by legal science.  The legal science is found in the theory of Kelsen which provides 
that once the change is efficacious then a revolution is complete.  If the revolution 
is successful, a loyal judge can only resign, whereas a judge who follows legal 
science can continue with his useful role.2  Harris contends that Kelsen’s theory 
does not directly authorize a judge to make any particular decision.  Kelsen’s 
theory implies that a judge is under a legal duty, a duty consonant with judicial 
office, to accept successful revolutions.  It seems probable that this duty is not 
outweighed by any general duty of constitutional loyalty.  It may, however, like 
any other legal duty, be outweighed in particular instances by moral or political 
duties.3 
 
There are revolutionary judges who have joined in the overthrow of the old 
constitutional orders.  An example of such revolutionary judges can be illustrated 
by Judge A.G. Magrath of Charlestown, South Carolina, who, on 7 November 1860 
resigned his office and, in what must have been a dramatic ceremony, descended 
from the bench into the body of the court and formally divested himself of his 
judicial robes and declared that the temple of justice was now closed.  Later on, 
after playing a prominent role in triggering off the American Civil War, he returned 
and re-opened the temple of justice as a court of the revolutionary state.  This is 
an example par excellence of a judge joining the revolution.4 
 
 
 
 
 
1. J.W. Harris, ‘When and why does the Grundnorm change” 1971,Cambridge Law Journal at 127 
2. J.W. Harris, at 127 
3. J.W. Harris, at 132 
4. Madzimbamuto v Lardner Burke, N.O. and Another 1968(2) S.A. 284 at 313 RAD 
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There were judges and magistrates who remained on the bench throughout the 
War of Independence until and after the people had accomplished a successful 
revolution which untied the apron strings binding them to Britain.5 
 
The English revolution of 1688 legitimized the Bill of Rights of 1689 and all that 
followed because it was successful and because the judges accepted bills assented 
to by the usurper, William of Orange, as authentic Acts of Parliament.  The 
revolution of 1642-49 was accepted by those judges who remained in office after 
Charles 1’s execution as legitimising Cromwellian’s legislation, but with the 
restoration of Charles II in 1660 all became null and void.6 
 
Kelsen’s thesis is of great assistance when it is presented to a judge who has 
decided to remain in office after a revolution has been carried and then finds that 
he is expected to produce respectable legal reasons for staying on and giving 
effect to the edicts of the new regime.  Such a judge usually relies on Kelsenian 
theory to support his decision to be part of the new regime, as the example 
discussed below tend to indicate. 
 
4.1 PAKISTAN 
 
In the case of Dosso,7  Muhammed Munir C.J. dismissed the challenge to the 
validity of the new order on Kelsenian grounds.  The essence thereof was that a 
Constitution and the national legal order under it is disrupted by an abrupt political 
change not within the contemplation of the Constitution.  Any such change is 
called a revolution, and its legal effect is not only the destruction of the existing 
Constitution but also the validity of the national legal order.   
 
4.2 UGANDA 
 
In the case of Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons, Ex parte Matovu,8  Kelsen was 
successfully applied.  In 1966 Dr. Obote, the Prime Minister, removed the 
President, suspended the Constitution and procured the adoption, by a procedure 
not sanctioned by the Constitution, of a new Constitution under which he became 
President.  Matovu, who was placed in preventive detention under emergency  
regulations because he was feared, applied for habeas corpus on the grounds that 
his detention was ultra vires the Constitution of 1962.  Preventive detention means 
that one has not committed an offence but the powers that be fear you and to 
allay such fears one is kept in detention.  The application was referred to the 
Constitutional Court.  The court then asked for argument to be addressed to it on 
the validity of the Constitution itself.  The result was that it took judicial notice of 
the fact that the revolution had been efficacious in so much as the will of the 
Government was being generally obeyed, and dismissed the application. 
 
5. S.A.  de Smith, ‘Constitutional Lawyers in Revolutionary Situations’  (1968) Western antario Law Review at 
93 
6. S.A.  de Smith at 93 
7. 1958 PLD 533 SC 
8. 1966 EA 514 
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The Chief Justice said: 
 
 ‘The 1966 Constitution, we hold, is a new legal order and has been effective since 14th 
April 1966 when it came into force’.9 
 
Two points raised in argument are of general interest.  First, the Attorney-General 
had contended that the court had no jurisdiction to entertain an application on the 
validity of the Constitution itself as this was a non-justifiable political question.  
The court rejected this contention, though it could have provided an easy escape 
route.  Secondly, the Attorney-General had argued that the judges were precluded 
by their judicial oaths from questioning the validity of the Constitution under which 
they were officiating.  The court also rejected this contention, though not without 
some difficulty.  Under the Obote Constitution of 1966, the holders of judicial 
office had not been required to take new oaths of office but were deemed to have 
done so.  On the face of things, then, the judges were stopped from repudiating 
the regime which they had implicitly acknowledged by remaining in office.  But the 
wording of the judicial oath had not been changed, and under it a judge swore to 
do right to all manner of people in accordance with the Constitution of the 
sovereign state of Uganda as by law established.  The judges held that this gave 
them the right to decide which was the Constitution established by law.  They did 
not regard the fact of their continuance in office after the revolution as pointing 
unequivocally to their acceptance of the legality of the new regime.  The position 
can be clear if after the revolution the judges are immediately required to take 
new oaths to uphold the new Constitution. 
 
In the event of a revolution if judges resign in protest, their successors may be of 
so low a calibre that justice may not be done in the courts, whilst on the other 
hand, if they continue in office their real or apparent acknowledgement of the 
authority of the new regime will clothe it with the valued prize of legitimacy.  
Hence it is unusual for the conscientious and introspective judge in a politically 
volatile society to be impaled on the horns of a painful dilemma.10 
 
4.3 LESOTHO 
 
The first post-independence general election of Lesotho had been conducted on 27 
January 1970.  The opposition party, the Basutoland Congress Party under the 
leadership of Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle had won the election. 
 
 
 
 
 
9. Uganda v Commissioner of Prisons, Ex parte Matovu at 539 
10. R.S. Welsh, ‘The Function of the Judiciary in a Coup d’ etat’ 1970 S.A.L.J. at 191 
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The outgoing Prime Minister, Leabua Jonathan declared Lesotho to be in a state of 
emergency.  He said that he and his cabinet took the decision in full consideration 
of the best interests of the nation.  This drastic step had been taken to protect not 
only the liberty of the individual, but also law and order.  He said that the elections 
had been marred by acts of violence all over the country.  He formerly declared a 
state of emergency and suspended the Constitution pending the drafting of a new 
one.11  All the members of the National Executive of the BCP and most of the 
people who had contested the elections under BCP colours, regardless of whether 
they had won or lost seats, were arrested.12 
 
The High Court of Lesotho was due to open its first session for the year on 2 
February, 1970.  With the sudden suspension of the Constitution, it became 
doubtful whether the court would, in fact open.  An urgent petition to the High 
Court for the release of Dr. Ntsu Mokhetle was submitted.  The session of the High 
Court was suspended indefinitely.  Mr. Justice Jacobs declared that he preferred to 
wait and see.  He wanted to see whether the revolution was successful or not 
because there was opposition to it. 
 
The top staff at the law office who came from the Republic of South Africa on 
secondment had left the country.  The sheriff would not serve the summonses 
issued against the Prime Minister, and the petitioners had to serve them in  
person.13  
 
The decision to suspend court proceedings had been taken because of the 
continued existence of the High Court and the position of its judges as a result of 
the revolution that was still going on, and because of the far reaching 
consequences which orders might be issued and are later found to be useless. 
 
The High Court of Lesotho resumed its functions after the revolution was 
successful and Mr. Leabua Jonathan was in effective control of the country.  Those 
who resisted Jonathan’s coup d’ etat were charged with treason and sentenced.14  
Mr. Justice Jacobs adopted the approach in the case of Luther. v. Borden,15 which 
states that a court is not a polling booth to decide which government represents 
the people.  The Lesotho judge of the High Court closed the High Court until it 
was clear who was in effective control of the country.  The judge did not want the 
High Court to be used by the contesting political parties.  A polling booth should 
have decided who has won the election.  He did not want the court to be used in 
the bitter struggle for power and simply locked the court room. 
 
 
11. B.M. Khaketla, Lesotho 1970:  An African coup under the microscope:  London:  Hurst, 
1971 at 210 
12. B.M. Khaketla at 210 
13. B.M. Khaketla at 210 
14. Matsubane Putsoa v. Rex, 1974-1975 Lesotho Law Reports at 201 
15. 7 Howard 1 1848 
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4.4 RHODESIA: 
 
In Madzimbamuto v. Lardner Burke, 16 Beadle C.J. said that the court had never 
officially regarded the 1965 Constitution as lawful.  The judges appointed under 
the 1961 Constitution had continued to discharge their duties and the officers of 
the rebel government had duly enforced their judgements and orders.  Despite the 
fact that the High Court had not officially recognized the 1965 Constitution, it 
would be wholly misleading to assume that the High Court had not recognized any 
of the acts of the government.  So far as the acts of everyday occurrence were 
concerned, the court had undoubtedly taken cognisance of its acts.  The High 
Court treated such of the administrative and legislative acts of the government as 
has so far come before it as if they had emanated from a lawful government. 17 
 
Beadle C.J. went on to explain his approach to the position of the judges and of 
the High Court as positivist.  He warned that the courts should not involve 
themselves in the political struggle for power and much less should the political 
predilections of the individual judge be a decisive factor in determining the 
judgement of the court.  The law could not vary with the political views of the 
individual judge who declared it.  A judge’s views played a part, because in certain 
circumstances, the judge decided that rather than continue as a judge and apply 
such law he would go.  So long, however, as he continued to sit as a judge he 
declared the law as it is and not as it was or as what he thought it ought to be. 18 
 
In a revolutionary situation, the political views of the judge do not play any more 
significant a part in determining what the law is than they do in normal times.  In 
normal times, the government may press a statutory measure of which an 
individual judge strongly disapproves.  He may disapprove so strongly that he may 
not be prepared to apply the statute, and he may as a consequent decide to 
resign his commission and refuse to sit any longer as a judge, but his disapproval 
cannot affect the validity of the law.  If he decides not to resign but to continue in 
office, he must apply the law as it is, and not as he thinks it ought to be, and this, 
no matter how much he may disapprove of it. 
 
If, however, he remained, he would have to apply the new Constitution.  He could 
not remain and declare the law to be as it existed under the old Constitution 
simply because he was appointed under that Constitution and because he had 
never accepted the one or any appointment made under it.  If an old Constitution 
has gone completely, it is gone for all purpose and the method of its demise 
matters not.  If a judge remains under the new norm, he must accept that norm 
and cannot remain and seek to declare the law of a non-existent norm.  He has no 
right to elect which norm he will apply. 19 
 
 
16. 1968 (2)  S.A. 248 RAD 
17. 1968 (2) S.A. at 305 
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18. 1968 (2) S.A. at 326 B 
19. 1968 (2) S.A. at 328 
Quenet J.P. considered a submission by the appellant’s counsel, who submitted 
that the life of the Court was co-extensive with that of the 1961 constitution, 
because the Court was a creation of the Constitution and the judges were 
appointed in terms of that Constitution.  If the 1961 Constitution had in fact come 
to an end, the judges should quit the bench.  This submission raised the issue of 
whether the judges after the U.D.I. had that right to exercise judicial power.  
Quenet J.P. observed that neither Her Majesty in Council nor the present 
Government had interfered with the judiciary as constituted under the 1961 
Constitution.  On 14 November, 1965 the Governor said it was the judiciary’s duty 
to maintain law and order and carry on its normal tasks.  He said that the present 
government has not attempted to remove the judges from office, it had not placed 
any obstacle in their way and had given effect to their decisions. 
 
He said that the fact that the judges continued to exercise judicial power did not 
mean they were sitting as a court under the 1961 Constitution or that they had 
joined the revolution or made a personal decision to accept the 1965 Constitution.  
What it did mean was that while they performed the judicial function, they had to 
give effect to the laws and the Constitution of the effective government.  Before 
assuming office, a judge was required to take the oath of allegiance and also the 
judicial oath.  The judicial oath did not extend the duty set out in the oath of 
allegiance and the duty of any national born or naturalised citizen, or by a foreign 
resident in the country.  That is so because allegiance is not created by the oath, it 
exists apart from it and before any oath has been taken.20 
 
Macdonald J.A. said that if a court of law anywhere in the world were to insist that 
only the laws of a government with a legal origin may be obeyed and enforced, it 
would not be able to function because there is no such government.21  He said 
that all governments are extra-legal in origin in the sense that, if the pedigree of 
any government is examined, it will be found that at some point in time sovereign 
power had been established by naked force, by conquest, revolution or war.  The 
origin of European Government in Rhodesia and thus of such title as the British 
Government possessed in Rhodesia conformed to this pattern of extra-legality. 
 
So, too, the source of the present British government’s title to govern in Britain 
can be traced to the glorious revolution of 1688.  He said that a sharp distinction is 
drawn in law between persons who set up a de facto government by revolution 
and persons who, taking no part in the revolution, obey the laws of the de facto 
government in pursuance of the duty of allegiance owed to the state.  If 
obedience to the laws of a de facto government were not enjoined by the law, 
anarchy would likely ensue.  In a choice between anarchy and order, the law 
makes a realistic and sensible choice of order. 22 
 
20. 1968 (2) S.A. at 365 (RAD) 
21. 1968 (2) S.A. at 385 (RAD) 
22. 1968 (2) S.A. at 391 (RAD) 
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The early history of England and the English law relating to the allegiance due to a 
de facto sovereign explain in large measure the view strongly adhered to by all 
English jJudges that the judiciary should not meddle in politics.  Macdonald J.A. 
goes on to say that the lesson to be gleaned from the history of English law is that 
judges should not allow themselves to become embroied in political  controversy 
and in particular should not take part in revolutionary or counter revolutionary 
activity.  If a judge believes that a situation has arisen which in all conscience 
compels him to participate in revolution or counter revolutionary activity he should 
leave the bench and not seek to use his position to further his revolutionary or 
counter-revolutionary designs. 
 
If judges intend to resist unconstitutional change within the state such resistance 
should precede the threatened change and should not be delayed until after the 
new Constitution has been set up and a government has commenced to function 
under it.  The role of judges pursuant to their allegiance to the state is to support 
the government for the time being within the state and to avoid both revolutionary 
acts before, and counter-revolutionary acts after, revolution. 
 
There is no legal basis on which the courts can give qualified support only to the 
government of the time being within a state.  If such a government is the 
sovereign power within the state, it is entitled to full support.  If it is not the 
sovereign power, it is not a government and is entitled to no support at all.  There 
is no middle course. 
 
Jarvis A.J.A. 23 considered the Governor’s message issued on 11 November, 1965, 
to be basic as justifying the judges continuing in office.  The message included 
these words. 
 
‘I call on the citizens of Rhodesia to refrain from all acts which would further the 
objectives of the illegal authorities.  Subject to that, it is the duty of all citizens to maintain 
law and order in the country and to carry on with normal tasks.  This applies equally to 
the judiciary, the armed services, the police and public service.’24 
 
Jarvis, A.J.A. went on to say that the above should not be construed as an 
instruction to the judiciary as to the manner in which they should apply the law or 
as an attempt to interfere with the independence of the judicial discretion.  It did, 
however, place emphasis on the social need to preserve peace, order and good 
government. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Madzimbamuto at 416 (RAD) 
24. Madzimbamuto at 421 (RAD) 
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He said that legal effect should be given to such legislative measures and 
administrative acts of the government as would have been lawful in the case of a 
lawful government governing under the 1961 Constitution.25 
 
Fieldsend, A.J.A.’s view was that the court was nothing more or less than the court 
appointed under the 1961 Constitution and saw no basis which entitled it to hold 
that its source of authority had altered.  He concurred with Lewis J. where he said 
that the judges themselves held office under the 1961 Constitution and derived 
their functions from that Constitution.  He also concurred with Goldin J. where he 
said that his court derived its origin from and was lawfully constituted under the 
1961 Constitution, and the judges thereof continued to hold office and were bound 
by the oaths taken by them in terms of the 1961 Constitution.26 
 
In short there was no overt step taken by the rebel authorities to revolutionize the 
court or to set up their own court or to appoint their own judges, or to ascertain 
formally if any of the judges were accepting office on the terms set out in the 
1965 Constitution.  There was no question of the judges having expressly or tacitly 
agreed to hold office on any basis other than that of their original commissions.  27 
 
On Monday 4 March, 1968 Mr. Justice Fieldsend resigned as a judge of the High 
Court of Southern Rhodesia.  His reasons for resigning are written by R.S. Welsh 
as follows: 
 
‘To continue in office under the present circumstances, particularly in the light of the 
government’s declared intention not to recognise any right of appeal to the Privy Council, 
amounts to accepting the abandonment of the 1961 Constitution, both as an enforceable 
standard by which to Judge and as the source of authority of this court.  He said that for 
the reasons advanced in his judgement in the Constitutional case, he cannot accept this 
abandonment, with all it entails, and accordingly he was not able to continue as a member 
of the court.’28 
 
On 12 August 1968, Mr. Justice Young resigned his office as a judge of the High 
Court of Southern Rhodesia.  R.S. Welsh quotes him as follows: 
 
‘The High Court has hitherto functioned as court of the lawful soverign under the 1961 
Constitution.  The rebel regime has actively acquiesced in this mode of functioning by 
acknowledging the validity of the High Court orders and by carrying them into execution.  
The Judgement of the Privy Council, which is the supreme appellate tribunal of the High 
Court under the 1961 Constitution, becomes the Judgement of the High Court.’ 
 
 
 
25. Madzimbamuto at 422 (RAD) 
26. Madzimbamuto at 422 (RAD) 
27. Madzimbamuto at 425 (RAD) 
28. R.S. Welsh, ‘The Function of the Judiciary in a Coup d’ etat’ 1970 S.A.L.J. at 179 
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‘If, then, the authority of the Privy Council is not acknowledged in this country that is 
equivalent to a rejection of the authority of the High Court and in my view the only course 
open to a judge of the High Court is to withdraw from the bench.  It is a matter of judicial 
conscience. 
By the action of the Registrar of the High Court in refusing to receive and register the 
order of the Privy Council, the Judgement of the Privy Council has been repudiated and 
accordingly I have no alternative but to resign.  There can be no suggestion that my 
resignation or that of any other Judge must lead to a breakdown of law and order.  On 
the contrary, for a Judge appointed under the 1961 Constitution to enforce a law that 
subverts that Constitution is, in my judgement to overthrow the law of the country.  If 
order is to be maintained under some new system of law then it must be done by Judges 
appointed by those responsible for the creation of the new system.’29 
 
The judiciary stood firm concerning its own position in relation to the rebel 
government and the 1965 Constitution.  Lewis J. after suggestions in argument by 
Counsel for one of Mr. Smith’s ministers that certain dire consequences might 
befall the court if it took sides in what amounted to a political struggle between 
the British and Rhodesian governments spiritedly announced that so far as he was 
concerned, it was the court’s duty in every case to try to decide what the law is 
and to apply that law, irrespective of the circumstances, provided that the court is 
satisfied that the issue which it is asked to decide has been raised in appropriate 
proceedings and the Court has the necessary jurisdiction to make the decision.  He 
said that the question of taking sides did not arise.  The judge is merely 
performing the duty which he swore to carry out when appointed as a judge to do 
right to all manner of people, after the law’s and usages of this country, without 
fear, favour, affection or ill will. 
 
Sydney Kentridge says that the two judges who resigned thought that their oaths 
meant exactly what they said and they thought that these high-sounding principles 
namely, the oath, were not intended merely to be quoted at Bar dinners but 
actually to be acted on by judges.30 
 
Sydney Kentridge says that the majority of the judges of Rhodesia were able to 
uphold Mr. Smith’s actions and to validate, internally at least, what he had done.  
He says that they found excellent legal reasons for it, ranging from their duty to 
protect and preserve law and order to the international law rules relating to de 
facto rulers:  He said that, 
 
‘Mr. Justice John Fieldsend and Mr. Justice Dendy Young – names which, I think, should 
be honoured wherever English – speaking lawyers gather.’31 
 
 
 
 
 
29. R.S. Welsh at 181 to 182 
30. Quoted from “The Late Honourable John Richard Dendy Young” (1999)  116 S.A.L.J. at 152-153 
31. 1999 S.A.L.J. at 153 
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In conclusion, it is fitting to refer to Dr. Glanville Williams.  He said the defence of 
necessity involves a choice of the lesser evil.  It requires a judgement of value, 
and adjudication between competing goods and a sacrifice of one or the other.  
The language of necessity disguises the selection of values that is really 
involved.32  Maintenance of law and order was for the Rhodesian judges the 
supreme good.  Legal philosophies justify such an approach.  Pound sees law as 
seeking to maintain the social status quo and the general security, and argues that 
the chief of human claims in civilized society is the general security.33  The 
maintenance of order means securing continuance of the current form of political 
organisation and power.34  Accordingly, before choosing order the court should 
have examined the nature of Rhodesian society.  This was dominated by a 
powerful elite, the ruling white minority, which controlled all government 
institutions and most of the means of production so that maintanance of order 
would result in the preservation of this unequal society.  The reason for the 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence was to prevent a gradual improvement in 
the economic conditions of Africans and to prevent a shift in political power.  
Because the judges were unaware that they were choosing between conflicting 
values, they failed to ask themselves fundamental questions.  They should have 
inquired, of whom, by whom, for what purpose and in the context of what entity 
are we seeking to maintain order? 
 
 
32. Glanville Williams, ‘The defence of necessity’ 6 Current Legal Problems 216 at 224 
33. ‘The end of law’ (1914) Harvard Law Review at 195 
34. Julius Stone, The Province and Function of Law, Stevens and Sons Ltd, London, 1947, at 494 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
THE IMPACT OF A REVOLUTION ON SOME CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCEPTS: 
 
Some constitutional concepts shall be considered to determine the effect 
of the revolution on them. 
 
A revolution occurs whenever the legal order is replaced in an illegitimate 
way, in a way not prescribed by the former order.1  Every illegal change in 
the constitution of a state is a revolution.2  Therefore a revolution is 
contrary to Constitutionalism, because it is carried out in deliberate, total 
disregard of the Constitution.  The decisive criterion of a revolution is that 
the order in force is overthrown and replaced by a new order in a way in 
which the former did not itself anticipate. 3 
 
I shall examine constitutionalism in order to measure the performance of 
the rulers after a successful revolution. 
 
The liberal concept of constitutionalism rests on two main pillars namely, 
limited government and individual rights. 4 
 
De Smith gives a minimalist definition of constitutionalism as: 
 
‘The principle that the exercise of political power shall be bounded by rules, rules 
which determine the validity of legislative and executive action by prescribing the 
procedure according to which it must be performed or by delimiting its 
permissible content  ……………… Constitutionalism becomes a living reality to the 
extent that these rules curb the arbitrariness of discretion and are in fact 
observed by the wielders of political power, and the extent that within the 
forbidden zones upon which authority may not trespass there is significant room 
for the enjoyment of individual liberty.’
5 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. Hans Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, Cambridge:  Massachusetts:  Harvard 
University Press 1946, at 115 
2. J.M. Finnis, Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence, Oxford, Clarendon press: 1973: (edited by 
A.W.B. Simpson) at 44 
3. J.M. Finnis, at 44 
4. Issa G. Shivji, State and Constitutionalism in Africa:  A new Democratic Perpective at 3 
(This is a paper delivered in Zimbabwe on 22 May 1989) 
5. S.A. de Smith, ‘Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth today’, Malay Law Review, Vol. 4 
(1962) at 205 
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Kelsen believes that the legal effect of a coup d’ etat is the destruction of 
the norm.  This means that, in his eyes, the legal effect of a coup d’ etat is 
to remove a foundation stone of the collapsible inverted pyramid and thus 
to send the whole structure crashing down.6  I shall examine the effect of 
revolution, on various constitutional concepts. 
 
5.1 The Legislature: 
 
A revolution will invariably create a new legislative power which does not 
derive its authority from any provision of the pre-existing Constitution.  
This is illustrated by events in Lesotho in 1970 and Nigeria in 1966. 
 
The 1966 Lesotho Constitution provided that Parliament could make laws 
for the peace, order and good government of Lesotho.7  It defined 
Parliament as consisting of the King, a Senate and  National Assembly.  
The Senate was composed of traditional Chiefs and the National Assembly 
was composed of elected members. 8  In 1970 when it became clear that 
the opposition party led by Dr. Ntsu Mokhehle was winning the general 
election, the Prime Minister announced that the Constitution had been 
suspended and the general election nullified.9  On 10 February 1970, the 
Lesotho Order no. 1 of 1970 was made by Prime Minister Leabua Jonathan 
and seven other people whose names were listed in the order.  This order 
created a Council of Ministers.10  This Council of Ministers was given power 
to make laws that were to be styled Orders.  In this way, the power to 
make laws shifted from a democratically elected Parliament to an 
undemocratic Council of Ministers. 
 
On 15 January 1966, the Nigerian Armed Forces took over control of the 
Federal and the Regional governments.  Certain provisions of the 
Constitution of the Federation and of each region were suspended with 
immediate effect.  The offices of President, Prime Minister, Federal 
Ministers, and Regional Ministers were also suspended.  The Federal 
Parliament and all the regional Legislatures were similarly suspended 11 by 
the federal Military Government.   
 
 
6. Hans Kelsen, at 111 
7. Section 55 of 1966, Lesotho Constitution 
8. Section 40 of 1966, Lesotho Constitution 
9. The Friend, Bloemfontein, 2 February 1970 
10. Section 5 of Lesotho Order No. 1 of 1970 
11. A. Akinsanya, ‘The Machinery of Government during the Military Regime in Nigeria’ 
 (1976) Vol. 8 Journal of the Indian Law Institute at 16 
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It provided in section 3 that the Federal Military Government would have 
power to make laws for the peace, order and good government of Nigeria 
or any part thereof with respect to any matter whatsoever.   
 
This meant that the unrepresentative Federal Military Government had 
unlimited legislative power.  A new legislative power was created which did 
not derive its authority from any provision of the pre-existing Constitution.  
The conclusion to be drawn from the above examples is that, after a 
successful revolution, the government which emerges creates its own legal 
order from which it usually acquires unlimited and absolute legislative 
powers.  Its legislative acts are usually unchallengeable in the court.  An 
exception from the general rule would be the case where there is no 
change of personnel in the legislature as in Rhodesia after UDI.  Professor 
Ben Nwabueze says that there can be no change of personnel where the 
revolution is staged from within the government, by the ruler himself, as 
happened in Germany in 1933 when Hitler, as Chancellor, subverted the 
Constitution to assume absolute powers, or in Uganda in 1966 when Prime 
Minister Milton Obote abrogated the Constitution and declared himself 
executive president.12 
 
5.2 A Rigid Constitution 
 
A Constitution is regarded as being rigid where there are special 
procedures for altering, amending or repealing its provisions or some of its 
provisions.  Constitutions for which no special procedure for amendments 
are prescribed are known as flexible constitutions.13  The provisions of 
such constitutions are not regarded as having any special status and can 
be amended or repealed like any other law. 
 
In Nigeria, the 1979 Presidential Constitution was rigid.  None of its 
provisions could be amended without a special procedure.14  The standard 
procedure for amending a constitution was the requirement of a two thirds 
majority.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. Professor B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, London, Hurst: 
1973 at 231 
13. De Smith, Constitutional and Administrative Law, London, The Caucer Press:  1986 at 
24 
14. Section 9(2) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution 
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Other more complicating procedures required not only two-thirds majority 
of the legislative concerned but also approval by the legislatures of other 
states or the Federal legislatures as the case may be.15 The most 
complicated procedure was that relating to the creation of a new state.  
This required not only a special legislative majority of two-thirds and the 
approval of a given number of states but also the consent and approval of 
the people in the area concerned through a referendum in which at least 
sixty percent of those eligible to vote approved.16   
 
In certain specific cases, alteration of the Constitution requires an even 
more complicated procedure.  These are in respect of the alteration of 
section 9 itself, section 8 of the Constitution and chapter IV (which deals 
with Fundamental Rights).  Legislation for altering these should not be 
passed by either House of the National Assembly unless the proposal is 
approved by the votes of not less than a four-fifths majority of all the 
members of each house, and also approved by resolution of the houses of 
Assembly of not less than two-thirds of all the States.  It was not only that 
no provision of the 1979 Constitution could be altered by a simple 
procedure and majority but all the above examples show clearly that 
constitution was not only rigid, it was cumbersome.   
 
Under the Military rule in terms of Decree No. 1 of 196617 and 198418, by 
which the military established their legal authority and control of the 
country and government, sections of the Constitution which dealt with 
special procedures for amending were repealed.  In 1967 the creation of 
twelve states was effected by Decrees which did not follow any special or 
formal procedures.  Under military administration, the law provided for 
only one general mode of exercising legislative powers.  For the Federal 
Military Government, it was provided that the power to make laws would 
be exercised by means of Decrees signed by the Head of the Federal 
Military Government. 19  
 
Since this method was the only one provided for in the Decree, all laws, 
including the Constitution, were placed on the same level for the purposes 
of amendment and repeal.  As in flexible constitutions, the rigid 
Constitution of 1979 could therefore be amended like any other ordinary 
law by the military rulers.  
 
 
 
15. Section 9(3) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution 
16. Section 8 of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution 
17. The constitution Decree No.1 of 1966 
18. Schedule 1, Section1(1), Constitution Decree No. 1 of 1984 
19. Section 3(1) and 4(10)of Decree No. 1 of 1984 
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It is therefore clear from the above, particularly in respect of the simple 
mode of amending any law including the Constitution, that the Nigerian 
Constitution under the Military Administration is comparative to, for 
example, the flexible British Constitution. 
 
5.3 Supremacy of the Constitution: 
 
In Lesotho, under the civilian government, the Constitution was the 
supreme law.  Section 2 of the Constitution20 provided that the 
Constitution was the supreme law of Lesotho and if any other law was 
inconsistent with the Constitution, that other law would, to the extent of 
the inconsistency, be void.  The supremacy of the Constitution was 
reversed after the 1970 coup d’ etat.  Section 3 of the Lesotho Order No. 1 
of 1970 provided that the existing laws would be construed with such 
modifications, adaptations, qualifications as would be necessary to bring 
them into conformity with the provisions of the order.  Therefore, 
supremacy shifted from the Constitution to the law-maker, the Council of 
Ministers which had suspended the entire Constitution.21 
 
In the same way, in Nigeria, section 1 of 1979 Constitution22 provided that 
the Constitution was supreme, that its provisions had binding force on all 
authorities and persons throughout the country and that any other law 
inconsistent with its provisions would be void to the extent of the 
inconsistency.  In other words, the Constitution prevailed over any other 
law.  The supremacy of the Constitution was reversed by the military 
rulers.  Among the provisions of the 1979 Constitution modified by the 
military rulers was the supremacy provision.23  Among the provision of the 
1979 a provision was added to it, to the effect that the Constitution would 
not prevail over a Decree, and that nothing in the Constitution would 
render a provision of a Decree void to any extent whatsoever.24  In the 
case of Lakanmi and another v Attorney General of Western State and 
others25, the Western Court of Appeal held that once a Decree was made, 
as provided for in Decree No. 1 of 1966 , nothing, not even the provision 
of the Constitution, could derogate there from. 
 
 
 
 
20. Lesotho Independence Constitution 1966  
21. Order no. 2 of 1970 
22. Section 1 of the 1979 Constitution of the federal republic of Nigeria 
23. Schedule 1 Section 1(1) of the 1979 Nigerian Constitution 
24. The Federal Military Government (Supremacy and Enforcement of Powers)  Decree No. 13 of 1984 
25. SC 58/69 of April 24, 1970 
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5.4 Separation of Powers: 
 
The doctrine of the separation of powers is premised on the proposition 
that government has three basic branches, the Legislative, the Executive 
and the Judiciary.  It rests on the idea that it is dangerous to liberty to 
concentrate these three areas and powers in one body or that none of 
these three branches should exercise the functions of the others.  Since a 
complete separation of powers is neither practical nor desirable for 
effective government, what the doctrine can be taken to mean is the 
prevention of tyranny by the confinement of too much power on any one 
person or body and the check of one power by another.  The doctrine of 
separation of powers is designed not only to prevent concentration of 
powers but also to design a system of checking one power with another, 
that is, the principle of checks and balances.26 
 
Military administration, by its very nature, is based on a monolithic 
structure with its attendant concentration of powers.  It abhors diffusion of 
authority and power.  The essential requirement of the doctrine of 
separation of powers is often negated in military administrations.  This is 
particularly so in the case of the Head of a Military Government.  At the 
same time the executive authority of the country is often vested in the 
same person which authority he may exercise by himself directly or 
through persons, or authorities subordinate to him.  This is a virtual 
concentration or fusion of important powers and at the highest level of 
government which situation is not in consonance with the doctrine of 
separation of powers. 
 
Lakanmi and Another v Attorney General of Western State and Others,27 
provides certain instructive judicial views on the doctrine of separation of 
powers in a military administration.  The issue here was whether the 
Forfeiture of Assets Decree No. 45 of 1968 which expressly named the 
appellants in the schedule was a piece of legislation or judicial judgement 
and therefore void for infringing the doctrine of separation of powers.  The 
Supreme Court held that the doctrine of separation of powers was still the 
structure of the system of government. 
 
 
 
26. O.H. Hood Phillips and Paul Jackson, Constitutional and Adminstrative Law, London, Sweet and 
Maxwell: 1987 at 13 
27. SC 58/69 of April 24, 1970 
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The Federal Military Government after taking over the government of 
Nigeria passed Section 3(1) of Decree No. 1 of 1966 which did not confer 
judicial powers on the Military Government.  Decree No. 45 of 1968 was 
clearly a legislative sentence and the force was spent on the persons 
named in the scheduled.  These named individuals were deprived of their 
properties without a court hearing, that was an exercise of judicial power. 
It was believed that the property was acquired by corrupt means. 
 
The Supreme Court quoted a number of cases.  In the case of Lovell v 
United States it quoted the statement of Block J.28 
 
‘Those who wrote our Constitution well knew the danger inherent in special 
legislative acts which take away the life, liberty or property of particular named 
persons, because the legislature think them guilty of conduct which deserves 
punishment.  They intended to safeguard the people of this country from 
punishment without trial by duly constituted courts.’ 
 
One of the main objections to Decree No. 45 of 1968 was that it was 
directed against certain named individuals with the aim of punishing them 
or depriving them of their properties.  These individuals were not being 
dealt with as general members of the public for whom laws are passed 
generally.   
 
It is submitted that where legislation lays down the law and at the same 
time without any hearing, that law passes judgement against named 
individuals, such would be regarded as a usurpation of judicial function.  
Therefore, Ddecree No. 45 of 1968 was a legislative judgement and an 
exercise of judicial power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
28. (1946) 66 S.C.R. 1079 
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The doctrine of the separation of powers can, in military regimes, be 
infringed in respect of judicial power too.  Ken Saro-Wiwa, a writer and 
minority rights activist, and eight companions, all from Ogoniland, River 
State in the Niger Delta of South-East Nigeria, were hanged at Port 
Harcourt on 10 November 1996, provoking an international outcry against 
the military regime of General S. Abacha and proposals for intensified 
sanctions were made.29 Saro-Wiwa had campaigned against environmental 
damage and for greater benefits for the local population from exploitation 
of the Niger Delta by major oil corporations.  He insisted that the charges 
against him of the murder of four pro-government leaders of the Ogoni 
people in 1994 were false. 
 
A military tribunal in Port Hartcourt had found Saro-Wiwa and three others 
guilty on 31 October 1995.  All the military tribunal’s death sentences were 
confirmed by the Provisional Ruling Council on 8 November 1995.30   
 
The contentious issue was that Saro-Wiwa and his companions were not 
soldiers who had committed an offence falling within the jurisdiction of the 
ministry of defence to justify their trial by a military tribunal.  He was a 
civilian.  Therefore, the ordinary courts were by-passed in the 
determination of the allegations against them by setting up a special 
tribunal.  They were tried for committing an offence, namely murder, 
which the criminal courts of Nigeria were competent to hear.  There was 
no need for a specialist tribunal, namely the military tribunal, as the 
criminal courts were better equipped than the military tribunal to deal with 
a murder charge.  The military tribunal was ill-qualified.  It is submitted 
that the military tribunal was a substitute of the judiciary.   
 
By creating the special military tribunal, the executive usurped the function 
of the judiciary.  The military tribunal was set up for fear that the judiciary 
may exercise its independence and uphold its responsibility as the upper 
guardian of human rights and fundamental freedom. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
29. Keesing’s record of World Events, Vol. 41 Number 11 of 1995 at 40806 
30. Keesing’s record of World Events, at 40806 
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5.5 The Rule of Law: 
 
While the concept of the Rule of Law might not have a settled meaning or 
content, its one abiding principle is regularity of the law, the idea that man 
is governed by law and not by the caprice of rulers.  As far back as 2000 
B.C. the great Greek philosopher, Aristotle had preached that the rule of 
law is preferable to the Rule of Man, and the English legal philosopher, 
Bracton asserted that man is governed by either human or divine law and 
that although the King might not be subject to man, he is subject to God 
and the law because it is the law that made him King.31 
 
Professor A.V. Dicey32 was the first person to reduce the idea of the Rule 
of Law to precise legal form.in his lectures on English law at the University 
of Oxford in 1885.  His ideas were premised on the British Constitution.  
He reduced the term Rule of Law to the tripartite formula that: 
 
(a) ‘Every person must be equal before the law. 
(a) The rights and duties of British subjects are part of the English Common law 
and were neither conferred by any statute nor by any special Constitution.  
Rights, like freedom of movement, speech, religion and association were part 
of the common law as declared or propounded by the majesty’s Courts.  The 
point being sought to be made here is that the liberties and rights of the 
British subjects are inherent in the tradition of the people as contained in 
their common custom, that is, the common law. 
(b) The Rule of Law excludes arbitrary powers.  Discretion is however part of it.  
However, while discretion is an essence of government, too wide a discretion 
is not permissible because, otherwise, it might be difficult to draw a line 
between what is discretionary and what is arbitrary.  Every exercise of power 
must have limits.’ 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
31. Jennings, The Law and the Constitution  (London), 1993 at 42-45 
32. A.V. Dicey. The Law of the Constitution , Bond R. Clark Ltd: London 1968 at 202 
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Writers have attempted a definition of the doctrine, Finnis wrote that, 
 
‘The Rule of Law involves certain qualities of process which can be systematically secured 
only by the institution of judicial authority and its exercise by persons professionally 
equipped and motivated to act according to law.’ 
 
Its content includes the independence of the judiciary, the openness of 
court proceedings, the power of the courts to review the proceedings and 
actions not only of other courts but most other classes by official decisions 
and the accessibility of the courts to all, including the poor.33 
 
A legal system according to Fon Fuller exemplifies the Rule of Law to the 
extent that its rules are inter alia prospective, not retroactive, and are not 
in any other way impossible to comply with, that its rules are promulgated, 
clear and coherent, one with another, that its rules are sufficiently stable 
to allow people to be guided by their knowledge of the content of the 
rules.34 
 
F.A. Hayek provides one of the clearest and most powerful formulations on 
the ideas of the Rule of Law.  To him, government in all its actions is 
bound by rules fixed and announced before hand, rules which make it 
possible to foresee with a fair degree of certainty how the authority will 
use its coercive powers in given circumstances, and to plan one’s individual 
affairs on the basis of this knowledge.35 
 
In other words any just law is not a mere contrivance borne in mind and 
kept secret by the ruler to be promulgated only after a person has been 
seen doing an act and is punished for the act retrospectively.  The 
existence of the law must be known both to the ruler and the ruled. The 
rule of law seeks to ensure that adjudicators carry out their task in a 
manner that is procedurally fair. 
 
Professor Wade takes the view that every act of governmental power, that 
is, every act which affects the legal rights, duties or liberties of any person, 
must be shown to have strictly a legal pedigree.  The affected person may 
always resort to the courts of law, and if the legal pedigree is not found to 
be perfectly in order, the court, will invalidate the act, which he can then 
safely disregard.  He therefore said that the Rule of Law demands that: 
 
‘(a)  all acts must be in accordance with the law to be valid. 
 
33. John Finnis, Natural Law and National rights (Oxford 1980) at 272-3 
34. Fon Fuller, The Morality of Law:  Yale University Press, 1969: at 50 
35. F.A. Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, Chicago, Phoenix Books 1944 at 54 
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(b) That government activities must be conducted within a framework of 
defined rules and regulations. 
(c) That disputes involving legality of government actions must be decided 
by courts independent of the government. 
(d) There should be no undue privileges and discrimination in society and; 
(e) That no one should suffer punishment outside the authority of the law.’
36 
 
The International Commission of Jurists has on at least three occasions 
attempted to throw further light on the doctrine.  In 1955 in Athens, the 
Commission declared that the Rule of Law meant that the State, like the 
governed, must be bound by law; all governments must respect individual 
rights and provide effective means of enforcing such; that jJudges must 
adhere to the Rule of Law, and adjudicate without fear or favour.   
 
They must resist attempts from any quarter to jeopardise their 
independence in the performance of their functions and duties.  Lawyers 
all over the world must guide the independence of their profession and 
uphold the Rule of Law in the practice of their professions.  In order to 
ensure democracy, legislatures must be freely elected.37 
 
In 1959, there was another conference of the Commission in Delhi, India 
in which the meaning and scope of the Rule of Law were re-examined.  
The outcome of the deliberations was an extended and enlarged meaning 
and scope of the concept.  The Commission declared that the Rule of Law: 
 
‘Should be employed not only to safeguard and advance the civil 
and political rights of the individual in a free society but also 
establish social, economic, cultural and educational conditions under 
which his legitimate aspirations and dignity may be realised’
38 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 ECS Wade and A.W.  Bradley, Constitutional and Adminstrative Law, London and New York:  
Longman Group Limited 1985: at 92 
37. International Commission of Jurists, The Rule of Law and Human Rights – Principles and 
Definitions, 1966 at 43 
38. Journal of the International Commission of Jurists, 1959, Vol. 2 at 7 
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In another conference of the Commission in Lagos, Nigeria 1961, the 
Commission arrived at a substantially similar definition of the Rule of Law.  
The Delhi and Lagos meetings not only approbated the juridical and 
classical meaning of the concept but gave it a new and expanded 
materialistic meaning, particularly in the context of developing countries of 
the third world.   
 
The Rule of Law can, therefore, be seen to have metamorphosed from its 
original conception as a natural law divine concept against which municipal 
laws are to be measured in the classical Diceyan conception as rights 
ultimately culminating in the Delhi and Lagos formulae of an admixture of 
the classical and the materialistic meaning, with greater emphasis on the 
latter particularly in relation to the third word countries.39 
 
Military administration is necessarily a regime of force.  Its manner of 
coming to power is invariably by a forcible subjugation and replacement of 
a pre-existing order in a way not contemplated by such old order.  From 
whichever angle it is viewed, it is a violation of constitutionalism.  Although 
it is possible to argue that in some countries, the military have been 
compelled to assume power as a result of the breakdown of 
constitutionalism, this does not affect the fact of their initial 
unconstitutional act.   
 
Even the provisions of section 1(2) of the 1979 Constitution to the effect 
that the Federal Republic of Nigeria shall not be governed, nor shall any 
person or group of person take control of the Government of Nigeria or 
any part thereof, except in accordance with the provisions of this 
Constitution,40 was not a sufficient deterrent to the military take-over of 
31 December 1983. 
 
Military government has always been a government under the law.  
Military government is not a system of government in which a despot or a 
military oligarchy operating above the law exercises absolute power.  It is 
rather a system of government which after coming into existence by 
overthrowing the existing legal order, replaces it by a new legal order. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
39. International Commission of Jurists, the Rule of Law and Human Rights – Principles and 
Definitions: 1966 at 15 
40. 1979 Nigerian Constitution 
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Accordingly, every military government has always made a Constitution for 
itself by which the structure of government, powers and functions of 
governmental organs are spelt out.  By so doing legal limitations are 
placed on governmental institutions and their activities.  A good example is 
the provision to be found in all decrees on the Constitution that a decree 
needs the signature of the Head of State and Commander-in Chief of the 
Armed Forces to become law and this is a function he cannot delegate.  
Although the broad effect of this arrangement is to produce a system of 
government organised by law, where governmental powers are defined by 
law, and where it is possible for the military leaders to claim as they do, 
that they recognize and have regard for the Rule of Law, the truth 
however is that these arrangements per se are inadequate for a claim to 
observance of the Rule of Law.   
 
There could be a world of difference between government under law and 
government under the Rule of Law while it must be appreciated that all 
the military administration the world over has operated under law, they 
are still lacking those elements of constitutionalism which keep them away 
from being governments under the Rule of Law.   
 
Constitutionalism involves not only the proposition that the exercise of 
governmental powers must be bound by rules but also that the 
government is genuinely accountable to an entity or organ distinct from 
itself, where elections are freely held on a wide franchise at frequent 
intervals, where political groups are free to organise in opposition to the 
government in office and where there are effective legal guarantees of 
fundamental civil liberties enforced by an independent judiciary.41   
 
The nature of military administration does not admit of all these 
requirements.  There can be government under law but certainly not 
under the Rule of Law. 
 
5.6 On Fundamental Rights: 
 
Every society which is governed by laws must necessarily recognise rights 
and duties for its citizens.  It is irrelevant that these may or may not be in 
written form.  It is recognised, however, that some rights are so important 
as to be considered fundamental, the reduction of which disqualifies such 
a society from being rated civilized.   
 
41. SA De Smith, The New Commonwealth and its Constitutions, London, Stevens and 
Sons: 1964 at 106 
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They have at the earlier stages been described as divine or natural rights 
which are part of nature’s inalienable gift to human existence.42  The 
French Revolution 1798 and the French Declaration of Independence and 
the American Bill of rights were inspired by this idea of the natural rights 
of man.43 
 
The need for special study of fundamental rights under a military 
administration does not necessarily imply that in all cases such rights are 
more denied under a military administration than they are under a civilian 
administration.  What calls for special attention is that the very 
undemocratic nature of a military administration raises immediate 
problems for the existence and operation of rights.  There have indeed 
been very dark moments for fundamental rights during the period of 
civilian administration in many countries. 
 
5.7 The Right to Life: 
 
This is a very important fundamental right.  Without it other rights cannot 
be enjoyed.  Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
provides that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of 
person.44 In Grenada on 19 October 1983, the People’s Revolutionary 
Government was toppled.  Maurice Bishop the Prime Minister, along with 
some of his Ministers and other citizens were killed and power was seized 
by the army.  It constituted itself as the Revolutionary Military Council and 
promptly imposed a dusk to dawn, shoot on sight, curfew, thereby 
effectively putting the entire population of Grenada, save for a favoured 
few, under house arrest for four days.45 
 
In Uganda, on 25 January 1971, General Idi Amin ousted President Milton 
Obote.  He had presented himself as a devout Muslim, tolerant of all 
religious persuasions.  There was soon, however, evidence to the contrary 
as prominent Christians began to disappear without trace.46 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42. J.W. Harris, Legal Philosophies, London, Butterworths, 1980 at 10 
43. Issa G. Shivji, The Concept of Human Rights in Africa, London, Ryan Print:  1989 at 16 
44. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
45. Mitchell and others V. Director of Public Prosecutions and Another 1985 LRC at 138 
46. Lorenzo, S. Togni, The Struggle for Human Rights:  An International and South African 
Perspective, Cape Town, Juta 1994 at 120 
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Ugandans from all walks of life continued to disappear throughout Amin’s 
rule.  Many of them were found brutally murdered.  These included Wilson 
Oryma, a cabinet minister’s son.  Soon after landing at Uganda’s Entebbe 
Airport, he was abducted and killed.47 A prominent official in the Ugandan 
Foreign Ministry, Godfrey Kigalla, was seen at a meeting with Idi Amin and 
two of his bodyguards.  His badly mutilated body was found some time 
later.48  
 
Amin then turned his attention to the army where individuals whom he did 
not trust or like were never seen by their relatives again.  In one mass 
killing, it is said that about 2 000 Obote supporters were executed in cold 
blood during 1971.  Not trusting his fellow Ugandans, Amin hired a 
number of mercenaries to serve in his forces, many of them from Southern 
Sudan and Zaire.  Many other important Ugandans also disappeared 
without trace. 
 
In February 1973, an East African medical conference was held in Uganda.  
As delegates filed in they were told that the conference director’s assistant 
had disappeared without trace.49 Amin had created an organisation known 
as the Public Safety Unit (PSU) a sinister security force made up of Amin’s 
loyal followers and headed by Alli Towelli, who later became Deputy 
Commissioner of Police.  Relatives of missing persons could contact the 
PSU and after payment of substantial bribes to officers of the unit were 
taken to the corpses of their loved ones.50 
 
In the Central African Republic, on the morning of 1 January 1966, Colonel 
Bokassa, the Chief of Staff in the Ministry of Defence addressed the nation 
on Radio Bongui, saying among other things, that the government had 
been taken over by the armed forces.51 He brooked no opposition and any 
form of action  that seemed to threaten his authority was met with strong 
and conclusive action.  His one-time associate, Alexandra Bonga, Minister 
of Health, was accused of plotting against him and after securing a quick 
conviction, Bokassa had him shot.  He imprisoned ministers who were 
popular and might therefore threaten his position.   
 
 
47. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 121 
48. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 121 
49. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 121 
50. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 121 
51. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 121 
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In 1979, he once again came to the world’s attention when he had several 
dozen school children murdered merely because they would not buy school 
uniform supplied by one of his close supporters.52 
 
In Lesotho, after the 1970 coup d’ etat fundamental rights were violated at 
an appalling rate.  For instance, Clement Moabi Leepa, a former Deputy 
Commissioner of Police was killed  in a gun battle by members of the Para-
mobile Unit, and his corpse was disembowelled and displayed in the 
charge office of the police station in Maseru.53 
 
Nigeria became a republic in 1963 with Nnandi Azikiwe as the first 
president, but in 1966 a military coup forced him from office.  The 
operations in the Northern capital, Kaduna, were successful in 
overthrowing the regional government of Sir Ahmudu Bello, who was killed 
when the soldiers stormed his official residence.  The head of the Western 
regional government, Chief Abintola was killed.   
 
The Federal Prime Minister, Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa, and his Minster 
of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Ebo, were kidnapped and taken to an 
unknown destination, where some days later their bodies were discovered 
by villagers.54 
 
News that the Nigerian regime, had on 10 November 1996, hanged Saro-
Wiwa, Beribor ber, Saturday Dobee, Nordu Eawo, Daniel Gbokoo, Berinem 
kiobel, John Nuate, in defiance of Commonwealth members’ appeals, 
caused a sensation.  President Mandela of South Africa abandoned his 
previous conciliatory attitude and called for Nigeria’s expulsion form the 
Commonwealth.  Commonwealth leaders voted for Nigeria’s suspension 
from the organisation, warning that Nigeria could be expelled from the 
Commonwealth unless there was a return within two years to democratic 
government and respect for human rights.55 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
52. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 121 
53. B.M. Khaketla, Lesotho, An African Coup under the microscope, London:  Hurst 1971 at 271 
54. B.O. Nwabueze, Constitutionalism in the Emergent States, London:  Hurst 1973 at 197 
55. Keesing’s record of World events, Vol. 41 Number 11, 1995 at 40806 
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5.8 Inhuman Treatment: 
 
Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that: 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.’ 
 
Coup d’ etats provide numerous examples of this right being abused.  For 
instance, in the Central African Republic, Bokassa became drunk with 
power and the following excesses were of such a nature that the people of 
the Central African Republic were brutally shocked into realisation of his 
true nature.  One of his biographers explains: 
 
‘He set out to inflict violence personally on fifty convicted thieves.  In July 1972, 
Bokassa decreed that captured thieves would be mutilated.  First offenders 
would have one ear cut off, second offenders, the other ear, and third offenders 
the right hand.  A thief convicted for the fourth time would be executed publicly 
by firing squad.’
56 
 
The United Nations Secretary General protested against these excesses, 
but Bokassa dismissed Dr. Kurt Waldheim’s protests as those of a 
colonialist and an imperialist.57 
 
As regards Lesotho, members of the Basotuland National Party Youth 
League of Chief Leabua Jonathan organised themselves into armed gangs 
and visited the homes of people who were known to belong to opposition 
political parties.  These poor people were burned out of their homes, taken 
out to the veld, beaten up severely to the point of unconsciousness and 
left there to get away as best they could, or die from exposure.  Chief 
Leabua Jonathan said that reports of these incidents had been 
exaggerated out of all proportion by political opponents who sought to 
discredit his government and his party.58 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56. Lorenzo, S. Tongi, at 126 
57. Lorenzo, S. Togni, at 126 
58 The Friend, Bloemfontein, 26 February 1970; Rand Daily Mail, Johannesburg, 27 February 1970 
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Herbert Nqamakele Molahleha, a prosperous businessman of Mafeteng, 
was arrested with his daughter, Puleng Molahleha.  He was made to strip 
naked in the presence of his daughter who was ordered to look at her 
father’s male organs to see where she had come from.  When Nqamakele 
protested, he was ordered to have sexual intercourse with his daughter, 
but he told them that was the limit and requested them to shoot him 
outright.  The daughter was then raped by one of the youths in the 
presence of her father.  His feelings at that time, as well as those of the 
girl, can better be imagined than described.  When Nqamekele was finally 
released he was both mentally and physically affected.59 
 
5.9 Rights of Refugees: 
 
South African refugees were also detained by Lesotho Police.  During  an 
interview in Comfimvaba, Mr. Masala said that he managed to escape from 
South African Police in Cape Town and was granted political asylum in 
Lesotho.  When a state of emergency was declared in Lesotho he was 
detained in  Maseru Central Prison without trial.  On his release, he had to 
re-enter South Africa on his way to Botswana and managed to pass a road 
block manned by South African Police near the Botswana border. 
 
A principal of Lesotho High School, Mr. Sidzamba says from Robben Island, 
he was granted political asylum in Lesotho.  When the state of emergency  
was declared he was teaching in Masitise high School.  He was detained 
from February 1970 to November 1970 without trial.  After his release he 
was ordered to report every Monday to a police station until November 
1971.  The reasons for the detention of South African refugees was to 
please the South African Government.  At the time Leabua Jonathan was 
an ally of the South African Government.  He and Banda of Malawi would 
pay state visits to Pretoria.   
 
These detention of refugees were in total disregard of refugee law. The 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in Article 14 provides: 
 
‘1. Everyone has the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution. 
2. This may not be involved in the case of prosecutions genuinely arising 
from non-political crimes or from acts contrary to the purpose and 
principles of the united Nations.’ 
 
 
 
 
59. B.M. Kheketla, Lesotho 1970, An African Coup Under the Microscope, London:  Hurst 1971 at 197 
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The protection of African refugees occurs mainly in the context of three 
conventions applicable to Africa.  Theses include the 1951 United Nations 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the 1967 Protocol Relating 
to the Status of Refugees and the 1969 OAU Convention governing specific 
aspects of the refugee problem in Africa. 
 
One should also consider a number of other international instruments 
which have been adopted in the general human rights area.  Relevant to 
detention of South African refugees in Lesotho is the convention of the 
Elimination of All Forms Racial Discrimination of 1965.  Although the latter 
convention addressed itself to issues of human rights generally, it was 
none the less of singular importance to South African refugees who were 
unwilling victims of racial discrimination. 
 
5.10 Freedom of Association: 
 
Freedom of association implies individual autonomy and choice in the 
pursuit of objectives.  It is a freedom where the individual is free to do 
whatever he desires, within the limitation of his reason and conscience. 
 
Freedom of association is a vital factor in mental development.  Without it, 
the individual cannot achieve personality or build his character to a point 
where life becomes rich and meaningful.   
 
The slave, the serf, the kept person, cannot progress adequately along 
these lines because the sources of personality and character formation are 
made avid and are starved by external constraint.  Only in voluntarism, in 
the making of personal decision and in assuming upon oneself the burden 
of the consequences, can human personality and character be fully 
developed. 
 
In Lesotho, Chief Leabua Jonathan, the Prime Minister, ordered the 
detention of a number of highly placed civil servants who he suspected 
were supporters of the opposition.60  Thereafter, Chief Leabua, in a 
circular letter to Permanent Secretaries and Heads of Departments, and 
signed by the Secretary to the Cabinet, issued a general ultimatum to all 
civil servants who knew they were supporters of the opposition to resign 
voluntarily, failing which the government would take immediate steps to 
remove them from the public service.  In part the letter said: 
 
 
60. B.M. Khaketla, at 263 
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‘The Prime Minister and Ministers have directed that all civil servants who, during 
the election and shortly after polling day, showed themselves by word and deed 
to be opposition supporters be given the opportunity to resign voluntarily 
forthwith or action would be taken against them.’
61 
 
When no civil servants resigned the promised action was taken swiftly.  
Several of those who had been detained were released, and immediately 
dismissed, losing all their benefits, pensions, gratuities and leave due to 
them.  The vacancies thus created were filled by raw recruits whose only 
qualification was membership of Chief Leabua’s political party.62 
 
A Convention of the Council of Europe provides: 
 
‘Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others, including 
the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interest.’
63 
 
It is submitted that like-minded individuals desire to form corporations, 
unions, clubs and groups through which they can effect a better division of 
labour and better accomplish individual objectives.  Politics is an activity to 
be conducted under rules, that groups in opposition to governmental 
policies could at the same time be loyal to their country and in agreement 
with their political opponents on such fundamental matters as fair play, 
sportsmanship and the basic constitutional structure of the State. 
 
5.11 What is Left of Judicial Review in the Military Regime? 
 
Judicial review has developed to a stage today when one can conveniently 
classify under three heads the grounds on which administrative action is 
subject to control by judicial review.  In the case of C.C.S.U. v Minister for 
the Civil Service, the court held that the first ground is illegality, the 
second irrationality and the third procedural impropriety.  Other countries 
recognise further grounds.64 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
61. The Friend, Bloemfontein, 26 February 1970 
62 B.M. Khaketla at 263 
63. Article 11 of the Convention for the protection of Human rights and Fundamental Freedoms. 
64. Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service (1985) A.C at 14 
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In Africa, since independence consistent patterns of governments have 
been emerging that control directly or indirectly the machinery and levels 
of executive power subject to no serious judicial supervision.  Military 
dictators like Amin of Uganda, promulgated penalty clauses that carry 
death penalty for acts that were not capital crimes at the time they were 
committed, that is, retrospective sentence.  They ousted the jurisdiction  
of the courts and systematically abridged the fundamental rights of the 
African people.  People were kept in prison without accountability to courts 
of justice.  It is a standard provision in all the constitutions operating in 
democratic countries, that everyone is entitled to a fair hearing and public 
trial, within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal 
established by law.  Nonetheless, it is a matter of great regret that despite 
the above provision it is no longer startling in military administration to 
find a person held indefinitely in executive custody without accusation of 
crime or a judicial trial.  
 
In Nigeria several decrees were promulgated which are retrospective in 
operation and also ousted the operation of the due process provisions of 
the Constitution by providing that the question whether any fundamental 
human rights provisions of the Constitution are being or would be 
contravened by these Decrees shall not be inquired into in any court of 
law.  Examples of such Decrees are Section 4 (2) of State Security Decree 
No.2 of 1984 which actually suspended chapter IV (Fundamental Rights 
Provisions) of the 1984 Constitution.   
 
The Federal Military Government Decree No.13 of 1984 lays down that no 
civil proceedings shall lie or be instituted in any court of law for or on 
account of, or in respect to any act, matter or thing done or purported to 
be done under or pursuant to any decree or edict. 
 
The State Security Decree No. 2 of 1984 gave the Chief of Staff, Supreme 
Headquarters, absolute power to detain anyone for as long as he liked in 
the interest of state security.  Power corrupts and absolute power corrupts 
absolutely.  Only the courts could have relieved the nightmare of unjust 
laws.  What was needed was a show of great determination of the courts 
to resist attempts by the executive to disarm them by enacting provisions 
which, if interpreted literally, would confer uncontrollable power upon the 
executive.  
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Folarin Shyllon,65 indicates a clash of mind with mind, that is between 
progressive minded judges and conservative minded judges.  Progressive 
judges showed determination and resistance in interpreting the Armed 
Forces and Police Act of 1967 which gave the Inspector General of Police 
and Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces arbitrary and untrammelled powers 
to detain anyone in the interest of state security.  They followed the 
settled doctrine of interpreting ouster clauses, namely, that they do not 
prevent the court from intervening in the case of excess of jurisdiction, 
and accordingly held that the exercise of power under a decree could be 
challenged though not the validity of the decree itself. 
 
The conservative judges made a sweeping retreat from the established 
doctrine of minimising the effect of ouster clauses.  An attitude that 
shattered all assumptions about civil liberties in military administration, 
conservative judges, more executive minded than the executive, laid down 
that the distinction between challenging the exercise of power under a 
decree and challenging the decree itself is not permissible.66  In Amin’s 
Uganda, the power of judicial review was thrown overboard. 
 
5.12 The independence of the Judiciary: 
 
It is almost universally acknowledged that one of the hallmarks of a 
democracy is the independence of the judiciary. A judiciary which exists 
merely to do a government’s bidding or to implement government policy 
provides no guarantee of liberty. 
 
Parliamentary democracy and the rule of law are dependent for their 
existence on an independent judiciary.  The judiciary must be independent 
at all times, for it is the last hope of the ordinary man.  In Liversidge v 
Anderson,67 the majority of the House of Lords took a view which they 
thought reflected the needs of the country in time of war.  But Lord Atkin, 
in a great judgement, vigorously dissented from this view, attesting to the 
fact that the concept of the independence of the judiciary is valid for all 
time and place.  He declared: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
65. Folarin Shyllon, `Freedom, Justice and the Due Process of Law`, People’s law, Vol. 2, 1988 at 14 
66. Folarin Shyllon, at 15 
67. 1942 A.C.  206 
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‘I view with apprehension the attitude of Judges who on a mere question of 
construction when face to face with claims involving the liberty of the subject 
show themselves more executive minded than the executive.’
68 
 
Lord Atkin spoke in the great tradition associated with the complete 
independence of the judiciary.  In order to uphold the independence of the 
judiciary Sir Edward Coke sacrificed his position as Chief Justice of 
England.69In our own time and continent under military administration, Sir 
Arku Korsah in Ghana similarly lost his position as Chief Justice, and in 
Amin’s Uganda, Benedict Kiwanuka paid with his life.70 
 
Some judicial appointments have been made under military rule to the 
various superior courts which have had adverse effects on the 
dispensation of justice and  also on the desire of capable men and women 
of calibre and intergrity to join the higher benches of the judiciary.  A 
single erroneous appointment affects the whole system.  So, when you 
have many wrong appointments, the whole system becomes rather 
corrupted.  Appointments to the higher benches of the judiciary should be 
seen as an opportunity to reward only upright men and women of good 
character and learning. 
 
5.13 Democracy: 
 
Revolutionary military governments are not democracies.  In western 
terms democracy has gone by the board when a group of officers seize the 
government, push the Constitution aside and abolish or suspend parties 
and elections.  The counterclaim has, however, been made, as, for 
example on behalf of the government of Pakistan, that, since the basic 
concept of democracy is rule by consent, when a government has popular 
support it is by definition a democracy regardless of its structure.  This is a 
claim to be rejected.  A government controlled by the military may be 
doing an admirable and necessary job, as in attending to corruption, or 
undertaking land reform in West Pakistan, but it is abusing the terminology 
to call it a democracy, even though it has the honest intention of creating 
conditions under which democratic institutions can be restored.71   
 
 
 
68. Liversidge  V. Anderson, 1942 A.C. 22 4 
69. Gretchen Carpenter, Introduction to South African Constitutional Law, Butterworths:  
Durban 1987 at 37 
70. Folarin Shylon at 18 
71. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise to Self-Assertion of Asian and 
African Peoples, Boston:  Beecon Press, 1962 at 283 
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The notion of a military democracy is in some measure a contradiction in 
terms.  It is not enough to establish a democracy that individual civil 
liberties are respected.  It is necessary in addition that the government 
must have been freely chosen by the people by means of an election held 
at fairly frequent intervals under universal adult franchise.  However, much 
a military government may accommodate popular consultation or 
participation by civilians, however much its policies and actions may meet 
with popular acceptance or reflect the nation’s feelings and sentiments and 
its love of democracy and freedom, its unrepresentative character alone 
disqualifies it to be called a democracy.  A certain amount of 
authoritarianism is inseparable from a military government.  It is by its 
very nature a regime of force.  The whole orientation of the military is 
based upon command, unified and hierarchical command, discipline and 
regimentation, and they would naturally be prone to carry this into 
government.  As a regime of force a military government does not admit 
opposition. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE 
 
Africa has experienced government above the law and change of 
government by force of arms, both of which have made human rights 
violations a common occurrence in the continent.  Where the process of 
change has occurred in a manner not envisaged by the existing legal 
order, the deviations have been justified on the basis of the Kelsenian 
theory of fundamental change of the grundnorm to legitimise the new 
regime.  Clearly this approach deviates from constitutionalism. 
 
Constitutionalism involves the proposition that the structure and 
administration of governmental power, including the mode of change from 
regime to regime, shall be according to pre-set rules enshrined in the 
constitution and delimiting the extent and context of executive, legislative 
and judicial acts.  Implicit in this concept is the idea that the reference 
point for legality or otherwise of a government is the constitution.  Thus, 
arbitrary assumptions or exercise of powers of government represent 
deviations from the rules. 
 
Professor Stanley de Smith1 prescribes what he considers to be the ideal 
content of constitutionalism.  That is, government accountable to some 
entity, frequent elections, based on a wide franchise, free competition for 
power holding among unlimited numbers of political groupings, a legalistic 
safeguard for civil liberties, an independent judiciary as adjudicator of 
disputes.  Constitutionalism is a principle which, according to Carl J. 
Friedrick, begins from the most profound values of humanity and human 
society.  He writes: 
 
`The first and foremost objective of the constitution is that of protecting the 
individual member of the political community against interference in his personal 
sphere of genuine autonomy’
2 
 
6.1 Uganda 
 
I shall now deal with the unconstitutional experience of Uganda, followed 
by the undemocratic experience of Lesotho. 
 
1. S.A. de Smith, `Constitutionalism in the Commonwealth Today`  Malay Law Review, 
Vol. 4 (1962) at 205 
2. Carl J. Friedrich, `Constitutions and Constitutionalism,` International Encyclopediae of 
the Social Sciences, 3318 at 319 
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Idi Amin of Uganda justified his coup against Obote because of 
unwarranted detentions, lack of freedom of speech, failure to hold 
elections and the continued state of emergency.  There were also 
economic grievances such as unemployment, corruption in high places, 
high prices and taxation.  The new regime’s first actions were to release 
political prisoners, lift the state of emergency and establish commissions of 
enquiry into corruption and mismanagement of public office.  In actual 
fact, however, the constitutional record of Amin’s regime was marked by 
serious deviations from constitutionalism and protection of individual 
liberties almost from the start. 
 
The regime’s legislative record was thus, characterised by draconian and 
arbitrary measures which matched with the usurpation of absolute powers 
by the military leadership. 
 
It took a full-scale military invasion by Tanzanian armed forces to dislodge 
Amin.  The withdrawal of financial and technical assistance by world 
powers which also weakened the regime contributed to his overthrow. 
 
Elections were conducted on 10 and 11 December 1980.  Milton Obote 
won the election, was democratically reinstated as new head of state and 
the chairman of the military commission became the Vice-President of the 
new regime. 
 
From its inception the Obote II regime faced stiff opposition.  The armed 
forces became a highly undisciplined instrument of repression, deliberately 
employed against the population. 
 
There was massive abuse of human rights.  Over a quarter million people 
were detained, tortured or killed in army barracks and illegal detention 
centres.  Hundreds of political detainees were held under the Public Order 
and Security Act, to die of starvation or torture in military custody.  The 
courts now became an instrument of the executive in political cases.3 The 
rural peasant and urban poor bore the brunt of the suffering caused by the 
repression and poor economy. 
 
The above is Uganda’s history of unconstitutionalism and instability.  The 
phenomenon was due to bad past political leaders who were politically 
bankrupt and lacked a correct political thought.   
 
 
3. Valerian Ovongi v Attorney General, Constitutional case no. 1 of 1983.  Amnesty 
International report on Uganda for 1986-1989 at 17 
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The roots of instability can be traced to reckless management of 
government organs after independence, making for disorderly government 
and hence, instability.  The army was a blunt, mindless instrument made 
up of uncivilised units. 
 
6.2 Lesotho: 
 
The 1970 coup in Lesotho was of a different character.  It was not a case 
of the military intervening either on behalf of themselves or of some other 
class of the elite.  It was a coup staged by the outgoing government itself.  
In Lesotho it was the government acting against the people with the 
backing of foreign interests. 
 
Lesotho, formerly a British colony, is a tiny, rugged kingdom which is 
completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa.  In 1966 it acceded 
to independence, and on 30 January 1970, it had its first post-
independence election.  When it became clear that the opposition party 
had won overwhelmingly, the Prime Minister, Chief Leabua Jonathan, 
immediately issued Proclamation No.1 of 1970 declaring a state of 
emergency.  It appears that the Prime Minister on the same date, 30 
January, suspended the Lesotho Independence Order 1966 and nullified 
the general elections.  Opposition leaders were arrested and the King was 
put under house arrest.  The outgoing government was able to stage a 
coup because of the collaboration of the army and the police.  In 
developed countries, the army and the police can refuse to be used by 
individuals who want to cling to power undemocratically.  The army and 
the police supported an unrepresentative government thereby 
undermining the right to self determination of the Basotho nation. 
 
Chief Jonathan’s refusal to accept defeat in the general elections is the 
greatest malady of the politics of emergent states.  This is characterised 
by the unwillingness of the rulers to relinquish power.  Political offices tend 
to become life appointments, resulting in a stratification of the society 
between the underprivileged masses on the one hand and a permanent 
class of rulers on the other.  To perpetuate their rule, the politicians 
pervert the political and electoral systems, and stifle any kind of 
opposition.  
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To be once a president is to undergo a complete personality 
transformation.  An African president feels a kind of demi-god, occupying a 
pedestal high above and far removed from the rest of his community.  He 
thinks himself as indispensable, a messiah, an incarnation of the state, he 
feels it inconceivable that he can thereafter be anything else but a 
president.  On 17 May 1997, Mobuto Sese Seko after surrendering power, 
announced that he was going to retain only the title President.   
 
The power is so intoxicating, the adulation so flattering, and the prestige 
and grandeur of the office so incredibly dazzling as to be almost 
irreconcilable with a new life as an ordinary citizen.  Hence the temptation 
to cling to the office for life.  Leabua Jonathan was removed from power 
by the army on 20 January 1986.  The 1986 coup d’ etat was the 
overthrow of unrepresentative government to replace it with an 
unrepresentative military government.  On February 1990, the army 
staged a coup against the army.  This was a power struggle where General 
Metsing Lekhanya was toppled. 
 
In March 1993 general elections were held, which paved the way for a 
civilian administration.  These were won predictably by Dr. Ntsu 
Mokhehle’s Basutoland Congress Party (BCP).  King Letsie III announced 
the dissolution of the BCP government and its replacement by an 
appointed council.  In developed countries when a man wakes up and 
announces the dissolution of a democratically elected government, he 
could have been ignored.  The best assistance to him in the circumstance 
would be to send him for mental observation.  
 
Mokhehle’s government was, however, eventually reinstated on 14 
September 1994 at the request of the President of South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Botswana after the Prime Minister had promised to observe a set of 
conditions imposed by the three leaders. 
 
The African experience has been characterised by a large number of 
coups.  At the heart of these coups is the violation of the right to self-
determination of the African people.  The notion of self-determination is an 
important feature of contemporary international law.  People have no say 
in a military administration and the democratically elected government is 
removed from power.  The head of state is no longer the elected man or 
woman but the man who holds the gun.  Government institutions become 
dominated by soldiers. 
Coups have been escalating in the post-independence Africa and the 
economic problems of Africa have improved since 1960. 
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There is no observance of fundamental human rights in a military 
administration.  People are deliberately kept outside the sphere of 
adequate protection and their inalienable right to self-determination is 
violated by the powers that be.  It is recommended that since Africa has 
the Organisation of African Unity, the role of the OAU should be 
strengthened to curb coups.  The path that was taken by the SADC 
countries of South Africa, Botswana and Zimbabwe in interfering in 
Lesotho in 1994 is recommended. 
 
On 25 May 1997, soldiers seized power in Sierra Leone.  Nigerian troops 
were sent in to restore the ousted President Ahmad Tezon Kabbah.  
Nigeria  had  an  unrepresentative  government,  she  was  interfering  in  
Freetown merely to ease her own isolation by the international community.  
Ghana also sent troops to Sierra Leone to boost the Nigerian forces 
already in place. Ghana’s President Jerry Rawlings said in Accra that the 
reasons for the 25 May coup in Sierra Leone were unjustifiable.  The 
United Nations expressed its determination to see the departure of the 
ruling armed forces Revolutionary Council.  If the use of international force 
becomes a last resort and inevitable, then it may have to come to that, 
United Nations Chief Kofi Annan said in London. 
 
The annual summit of the OAU held in Zimbabwe closed on 4 June 1997 
with a promise from its then new Chairman, President Robert Mugabe, 
that any future coups on the continent would get short shift from the 
continental body.  Mr. Mugabe told reporters after closing the three day 
gathering attended by 31 Heads of State from the OAU’s 53 member 
countries that future coups will be handled in a harsh way. 
 
For the first time in its existence, the OAU endorsed military intervention 
when it gave the green light for Ecomog, the Nigerian dominated military 
arm of the sixteen nation Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS), to drive out Major Johnny Koromet’s Military Council. 
 
The real situation arising across the African Continent is a fast growing 
demand by the people for a process of democratisation.  The wind of 
democracy is blowing through Africa.  We are witnessing a new phase in 
Africa, where the central demand is a demand for democracy.  The last 
OAU annual summit has condemned coups.  The masses of Africa have 
done away with a one party system to a multi party system. 
The ballot box must rule in Africa and the rule by gun must be broken. 
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